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I. INTRODUCTION

Effortless travel along a smoothly flowing highway is part of the American
automotive dream—yet it all too often is only a dream, as anyone facing daily
commuter traffic can confirm. According to the 2011 Urban Mobility Report by
Texas A&M University, traffic congestion in U.S. cities caused 4.8 billion wasted
hours and burned 1.9 billion gallons of fuel, resulting in a “congestion cost” of $101
billion,1 to say nothing of the tailpipe emissions of vehicles stuck in traffic. Since
1
DAVID SCHRANK ET AL., TEX. TRANSP. INST., 2011 URBAN MOBILITY REPORT 1 (2011)
[hereinafter URBAN MOBILITY REPORT], available at http://www.tti.tamu.edu/documents/
mobility _report_ 2011_wappx.pdf.
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1982, travel delay and the cost of congestion have multiplied by a factor of five.2
During the same period, traffic on the nation’s roadways has steadily increased. The
trend clearly appears in Federal Highway Administration statistics showing that from
1980 to 2007 the yearly number of vehicle-miles traveled on U.S. roads doubled,
reaching a remarkable three trillion miles.3
Drivers and vehicles competing for space within the limited confines of the
nation’s roadways create a classic “tragedy of the commons” by using more and
more of a freely available public resource—highway capacity—and degrading it
through their cumulative overuse.4 Policymakers continue to seek viable alternatives
to single-occupant vehicle travel, yet people balk at options that limit their freedom
to drive where and when they choose.5 At least for the foreseeable future,
transportation officials will need to cope with heavy and increasing use of the
roadway system.
The use of the roadways takes two main forms. The first form of use, and the
most apparent one, is for mobility. An interstate highway, built to handle large
volumes of fast-moving traffic, is the best example of a road intended for mobility.
Vehicles enter and exit at interchanges only, and between those points they flow
“freely down an unencumbered corridor ‘pipe’” without having to slow or stop for
other streams of traffic entering or crossing the highway.6 Nearly all travel, though,
begins and ends off the roadway system, in a place such as a parking lot or
residential driveway. This fact points to a second use of the road: it provides access
2

Id.

3

FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ANNUAL VEHICLE-MILES OF TRAVEL,
1980-2009, available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2009/pdf/
vm2.pdf. Travel declined between 2007 and 2009, likely due to the economic recession, but it
is once again increasing. A comparison of data between November 2010 and November 2009
shows a 1.1% rise in vehicle-miles traveled. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
NOVEMBER 2010 TRAFFIC VOLUME TRENDS, available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/tvtw/
10novtvt/ index.cfm.
4

Christian Iaione, The Tragedy of Urban Roads: Saving Cities from Choking, Calling on
Citizens to Combat Climate Change, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 889, 890-91 (2010). In his classic
article, biologist Garrett Hardin illustrated how, even when a common pasture is already
overgrazed, it is individually rational for each herder to add another animal (and another, and
another) to his herd since he receives the entire proceeds from selling it but the cost of the
overgrazing is shared by everyone. But as Hardin noted, “this is the conclusion reached by
each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is
locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit—in a world that is
limited.” Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
Many publicly-held resources are vulnerable to this problem. Hardin’s article gives as
examples cattle owners who pressure federal officials to allow more cattle to graze on leased
public land “to the point where overgrazing produces erosion and weed-dominance” and
tourists who visit national parks that are “open to all, without limit” even though “[t]he values
that visitors seek in the parks are steadily eroded” by the overwhelming number of sightseers.
Id. at 1245.
5
Shi-Ling Hsu, What is a Tragedy of the Commons? Overfishing and the Campaign
Spending Problem, 69 ALB. L. REV. 75, 126 (2005).
6

FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., WHAT IS ACCESS MANAGEMENT?,
available at http://www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov/access_mgmt/what_is_accsmgmt.htm.
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to properties that abut it. A residential subdivision street, lined with parked cars and
driveways, is a prime example of a road mainly intended to provide access to
property.7
Unfortunately, the mobility and access functions are often at odds with one
another, especially when traffic is heavy. When one vehicle turns from a main
arterial road into a side street or driveway, other vehicles on the main road must slow
down, change lanes, or stop.8 This disruption of smooth traffic flow might result in
an accident, particularly if another driver is not paying attention or makes a sudden
lane change to avoid the turning auto.9 More typically, the disruption caused by the
turning auto will persist as vehicle after vehicle brakes in response to the slowdown
in front of it. Similarly, when a vehicle attempts to enter a busy main road from a
driveway or side street, heavy traffic can make the movement difficult and
dangerous.10
In an effort to balance the competing functions of mobility and access, many
state and local governments are adopting access management programs.11 Access
management is defined as “the systematic control of the location, spacing, design,
and operation of driveways, median openings, interchanges, and street connections
to a roadway.”12 The goal of an access management program “is to ensure roadway
safety and efficient operations while providing reasonable access to the adjacent land
use.”13 When implemented on a given roadway, access management may mean
fewer (and more widely separated) driveways and street intersections; the
construction of dedicated right-turn lanes to driveways that serve multiple properties;
and the use of median barriers with openings located near traffic signals, so that leftturn and U-turn movements can only be made when oncoming traffic is stopped. In
the 101 urban areas studied in the 2011 Urban Mobility report, access management
techniques such as these reduced delay by 77 million hours.14
7

Id.

8

Id.; see also NAT’L COOP. HIGHWAY RESEARCH PROGRAM, REPORT 121, PROTECTION OF
HIGHWAY UTILITY 46-47 (1971).
9

A Purdue University study, published several years before the advent of the first
statewide access management program, found driveway-related crashes to be a significant
percentage (13.95%) of all motor vehicle accidents. WILLIAM W. MCGUIRK, EVALUATION OF
FACTORS INFLUENCING DRIVEWAY SAFETY, INTERIM REPORT (1973), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.5703/1288284313850.
10

WHAT IS ACCESS MANAGEMENT?, supra note 6; NAT’L COOP. HIGHWAY RESEARCH
PROGRAM, supra note 8, at 47.
11

According to data from the Transportation Research Board of the National Academies,
twenty states have extensive access management programs and all but ten have some form of
access management effort. ACCESS MGMT. COMM., TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., STATE WEB
PAGES (2009), available at http://www.accessmanagement.info/AM2005/StateWebpages.htm.
Each of the 101 urban areas given detailed study in the 2011 Urban Mobility Report reported
some level of access management, covering about one-third of the street miles in the cities.
URBAN MOBILITY REPORT, supra note 1, at B-31.
12
NAT’L COOP. HIGHWAY RESEARCH PROGRAM; REPORT 548, A GUIDEBOOK
INCLUDING ACCESS MANAGEMENT IN TRANSPORTATION PLANNING 3 (2005).
13

Id.

14

URBAN MOBILITY REPORT, supra note 1, at B-31, B-33.
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When more governmental control is exerted over where and how a road may be
accessed, however, the interests of the public may collide with those of property
owners. A few examples will illustrate the kinds of problems that can arise:
Some older commercial properties have their entire road frontage paved, so
customer vehicles turn directly from the road into parking spaces. Often, the
buildings are located so close to the road that the parking stalls overlap the public
right-of-way. Replacing this wide-open access with defined driveways lessens the
number of places where vehicles entering or exiting the parking lot can cross the
movement of vehicles on the road, limiting these “conflict points” to the discrete
areas where the driveways meet the road. Fewer conflict points mean fewer
accidents and less “friction” between through traffic and vehicles entering and
exiting the road. But if the commercial property was laid out so that the public road
functioned like a parking lot aisle, restricting access to one or two defined driveways
might mean a loss of parking spaces that the business depends upon.15
Gas stations provide another example of the difficulties that may arise when
modern access controls are imposed on older developed properties. Historically,
many gas stations were located at street corners and laid out with two driveways on
each side of the property so vehicles could enter and exit the rows of gas pumps
without having to turn around on-site. Traffic engineers studying accident patterns
have determined, however, that driveways near intersections cause accidents because
they require drivers to make too many decisions in too little space (and time).16 To
mitigate this problem, the street authority may reduce the number of driveways
allowed and require them to be as far as possible from the intersection.17 This
change in access may lead to litigation if the gas station operator perceives that it
will turn customers away.18
Disputes can also happen when undeveloped properties are affected by access
management efforts. One such case arose after the City of Waterloo, Illinois enacted
legislation that allowed access to a new bypass at widely-spaced street intersections
only, reasoning that the two-lane rural road might someday be improved to a fivelane urban highway.19 The Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) had
already granted driveway permits to the owners of a farm parcel abutting the bypass,
but when they later sought approval of a commercial subdivision using two of the
IDOT-permitted driveways, the city denied it as inconsistent with the ordinance and
15

Galvis v. Dep’t of Transp., 167 P.3d 584, 586 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).

16

FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., INTERSECTION SAFETY ISSUE BRIEFS:
ACCESS MANAGEMENT, available at http://www.safety.fhwa.dot.gov/intersection/resources/
fhwasa10005/doc/brief_13.cfm.
17
See, e.g., In re I/M/O Route 206 at Lot 13B New Amwell, 731 A.2d 56, 58-59 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (closing drive that was too close to intersection). New Jersey
requires 100 feet of clearance between a driveway and a signalized intersection. N.J. ADMIN.
CODE § 16:47-3.8(k)(3) (2011). If a property’s access points are placed at the corners farthest
from the intersection, it “interferes least with intersectional operations.” NAT’L COOP.
HIGHWAY RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 8, at 48. “As a general rule, the farther from an
intersection a driveway can be located, the less it will affect arterial traffic.” Id. at 53.
18

In re I/M/O Route 206, 731 A.2d at 63.

19

State Bank of Waterloo v. City of Waterloo, 792 N.E.2d 329, 330-31 (Ill. App. Ct.
2003).
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the projected future expansion of the highway.20 The farm owners argued that
Waterloo could not use driveways that IDOT had already accepted as a reason to
reject the plat, but the court held that a municipality could enforce access regulations
more stringent than the state’s.21
Another recent case involved an Ohio city’s effort to channel traffic from a
planned technology park onto an interior loop road being built by the city on land it
was appropriating for that purpose.22 At trial in the appropriation case, the property
owners claimed damages of $4 to $6 million for loss of access to the abutting state
highway, contending that their farm property had no actual access to the loop road
and that the remaining access to the state highway was insufficient for future
development.23 The jury found no damages and the appeals court affirmed, holding
that the jury could consider whether access to the loop road would be reasonably
foreseeable when the farm actually develops.24
When a government agency acts to regulate the consumption of highway
capacity by managing access to it—and, more pointedly, when an owner of abutting
property wants to have access to a public road in a way that the government agency
is not willing to allow, some important legal questions arise. What right of access
does the owner of abutting property have? How far can the government agency
regulate access to the road? Many courts hold that a taking occurs if a governmental
act amounts to a substantial or material interference with access, but how is that
measured? And what is “access” anyway?
This Article will begin by examining how the concept of a right of access to an
abutting roadway developed and how courts treated early efforts to regulate roadway
access for public welfare and safety. Next, we will see how public authorities began
to comprehend the differences between mobility and land access and to perceive the
conflict between traffic volume, traffic speed, and frequent driveways and
intersections. This new knowledge led to the adoption of statewide permit-based
programs to manage access to roadways using criteria calibrated to match each
road’s function in the continuum between access and mobility. We will identify
some of the important common features of those programs.
Turning to the modern law of access, this Article will highlight the significant
distinctions between access to land, accessibility within the network of roadways,
and access to traffic volume and suggest how the reasonableness of access can be
evaluated. We will then analyze what implications these distinctions have for access
management programs. Finally, we will consider the “access” concept as an
assertion of private rights in the commons of the roadway and what that means for
the balancing of public and private interests. The Article will conclude by
recommending that the adequacy of access should be evaluated in physical terms
only, because economic constructs such as the “convenience” of access amount to an
unwarranted claim to perpetuate a preferred location within the road network.
20

Id. at 330.

21

Id. at 332-34. Given the posture of the case, the court did not have to decide whether
the city’s actions amounted to a taking of access rights. Id. at 337.
22

City of Dublin v. Pewamo Ltd., 954 N.E.2d 1225, 1229-30 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011).

23

Id. at 1227.

24

Id. at 1228, 1231-32.
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II. THE UNCLEAR ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE “RIGHT OF ACCESS”
The United States is woven together by a network of roads—over four million
miles of them, occupying about one percent of the country’s land mass.25 Many of
these roads are owned by the public in fee simple. In other instances, usually in rural
areas, the right-of-way is a perpetual easement. Seemingly a lesser interest, a
highway easement nonetheless gives the public full control of the land between the
right-of-way lines, even as against the fee owner.26 This control is so broad that
there is little practical difference between a highway easement and public ownership
of the land on which the highway is built.27
Whenever we enter this roadway network—whenever we leave a driveway and
pull out into the street—an imperceptible and seldom-considered threshold is
crossed. The roads we use (and need to use) every day to reach our homes and
businesses belong to someone else.
Just what happens upon crossing the threshold between private property and a
public road is, in the realm of legal rights, a question that has bedeviled courts for
years. Some judicial opinions affirming that a property owner has a right of access
to an abutting public road speak rather cautiously of “a property right in the nature of
an easement in the street”28 or a “right . . . in the nature of a property right.”29 Other

25

U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, DISTANCE TO NEAREST ROAD IN
COTERMINOUS UNITED STATES, available at http://www.fort.usgs.gov/products/
publications/21426/21426.pdf. The percentage in urban areas is much greater: Even forty
years ago, a report estimated that “[a]bout 28 percent of the developed land of an urban area
may be devoted to highway rights-of-way.” NAT’L COOP. HIGHWAY RESEARCH PROGRAM,
supra note 8, at 35.
THE

26
See, e.g., United States v. Certain Land in Cook County, 248 F. Supp. 681, 682-83 (D.
Minn. 1965) (stating that owner’s fee simple interest was “burdened by a substantially
exclusive easement for highway purposes, and defendant retains no right to the use and
enjoyment of this land”); People v. Henderson, 85 Cal. App. 2d 653, 657 (Ct. App. 1948)
(stating that fee owners had no right to put a shed in the right-of-way, even though it did not
interfere with travel: “[D]efendants as owners of the fee would have had no greater right than
those who were strangers to the title.”); Paquet v. Mt. Tabor St. Ry. Co., 18 Ore. 233, 235
(1889) (“The establishment of a public highway practically divests the owner of the fee to the
land upon which it is laid out of the entire present beneficial interest.”).
27

See, e.g., Van Leuven v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 135 S.E.2d 640, 642-43 (N.C. 1964)
(stating that public control of a highway easement is “so exclusive in extent that the
subservient estate in the land . . . amounts to little more than the right of reverter in the event
the easement is abandoned” and “the difference between an easement of this nature and extent
and a fee simple estate in the land covered by the right of way is negligible”); 5 JULIUS L.
SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 16.02(7) (rev. 3d ed., 1997) (“Where land already
subject to a highway easement is taken for highway purposes it has been held that only
nominal damages may be recovered.”).
28
Bacich v. Bd. of Control, 144 P.2d 818, 823 (Cal. 1943); see also Simkins v. Davenport,
232 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Iowa 1975) (stating that the owner of land abutting a highway has “a
property right in the nature of an easement” of access to the highway); State ex rel. State
Highway Dep't v. 14.69 Acres of Land, 226 A.2d 828, 831 (Del. 1967) (stating that the right
of access is “said to be ‘in the nature of an easement’”).
29

County of Anoka v. Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d 331, 334 (Minn. 1997).
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courts step out further, calling this rather amorphous right “fundamental”30 or
“basic.”31 Still, its ancestry is “obscure.”32 As the New Mexico Supreme Court put
it, “The ‘right of access’ is apparently judge-made, the exact origin of which is
difficult to determine.”33
Yet origins are important. Early decisions on a subject are often the most
revealing, because when there is no precedent to lean on, courts must more fully
explain their reasoning. Understanding how, and to what degree, a particular interest
attained legal recognition is also necessary when considering whether it is
“sufficiently bound up with . . . reasonable expectations . . . to constitute ‘property’
for Fifth Amendment purposes.”34 For those reasons, we begin with a look at the
law of access at its inception.
A. No Compensation for “Right Use of Property Already Belonging
to the Public”: The 1823 Decision in Callender v. Marsh
In the early nineteenth century, when the nation’s surface transportation network
was in its infancy and travel moved no faster than a horse could go, there was little
need to regulate access between publicly-built roads and adjoining private property.35
Sometimes, though, public improvements to a road would affect an abutting
landowner’s access to it. Early roads often followed the natural contours of the land
over which they were built. As population and trade increased, local officials might
improve a road by building up the grade in a low place or cutting it down on a hill to
make the road easier and safer to traverse. Such changes, while beneficial to the
public using the road, could be detrimental to the properties next to the cut or filled
areas.
That was the problem presented in the widely-followed 1823 Massachusetts
opinion in Callender v. Marsh. 36 The case arose when the surveyor of highways in
Boston decided to reduce the grade of a road on a steep hill in front of the plaintiff’s
30

BSW Dev. Grp. v. City of Dayton, 699 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 (Ohio 1998).

31

People ex rel. Dep’t of Public Works v. Ayon, 352 P.2d 519, 522 (Cal. 1960).

32

D'Arago v. State Rds. Com., 180 A.2d 488, 490 (Md. 1962) (citing Bacich, 144 P.2d at

823).
33

State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Danfelser, 384 P.2d 241, 243 (N.M. 1963).

34

Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978).

35

The private builders of chartered turnpikes had a right to erect toll-gates and charge
people to pass through them, but even so, an abutting landowner had no duty to pay unless his
travel took him through a toll-gate. See, e.g., Buncombe Turnpike Co. v. Mills, 32 N.C. 30, 34
(1849) (finding that a company had no authority to charge for use of turnpike that began and
ended between toll-gates which, by statutory charter, had to be spaced at least ten miles apart);
Lexington & Georgetown Turnpike Co. v. Redd, 41 Ky. 30, 31-32 (1841) (holding that a
company had no claim against abutter who leased a strip of ground to connect his property
with the turnpike at a point between town and the first toll-gate, and closed up his access point
to the turnpike beyond the toll-gate).
36

Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. 418, 425 (1823). John Lewis, the author of an early
treatise on eminent domain law, described Callender as the “leading case” on street grades,
attributing to it “an important influence in moulding the law in this country.” JOHN LEWIS, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES § 94 (1900).
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house.37 Cutting down the road exposed the house’s foundation and endangered its
stability, requiring costly efforts to correct.38
The owner contended that the surveyor’s change to the grade of the road was a
compensable taking under the state constitution, arguing that a taking occurred not
only when an individual’s land is occupied for public use, “but likewise where he is
injured in respect to an incorporeal right.”39 The surveyor replied that, although
other individuals had suffered similar consequences from grade changes, no one had
ever brought suit before, “and if such an action can be sustained, it will put a check
to all improvements in our highways.”40
The Callender court agreed with the surveyor, deciding that a taking occurs only
when property is “actually taken” and occupied by the government, and ruling that
the constitutional provision requiring compensation for takings did not apply “to the
case of one who suffers an indirect or consequential damage or expense, by means of
the right use of property already belonging to the public.”41
As the court reasoned, neighboring homeowners have no right to seek payment
when a schoolhouse is built on public land, even though the resulting crowd and
noise may materially reduce the value of their dwellings.42 Moreover, even though
the road might have been established on an easement, with the abutting owner
retaining title to the soil, “the public acquired the right, not only to pass over the
surface in the state it was in when first made a street, but the right also to repair and
amend the street, and, for this purpose, to dig down and remove the soil sufficiently
to make the passage safe and convenient.”43
With regard to compensation, the abutting owner had a right to seek payment
from the government when the road was established “not only on account of the
value of the land taken” but also “for the diminution of the value of the adjoining
lots, calculating upon the future probable reduction or elevation of a street or road.”44
37

Callender, 18 Mass. at 425.

38

Id. at 425.

39

Id. at 429. The incorporeal right at issue in Callender was not access to the street, but a
right to rely on the earth under the street to provide support to the adjacent building. Whether
such a right exists was debatable, then and now. See Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 645
(1879) (“[T]his right of lateral support extends only to the soil in its natural condition. It does
not protect whatever is placed upon the soil increasing the downward and lateral pressure. If it
did, it would put it in the power of a lot-owner, by erecting heavy buildings on his lot, to
greatly abridge the right of his neighbor to use his lot. It would make the rights of the prior
occupant greatly superior to those of the latter.”); Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Tishner, 699
N.E.2d 731, 739 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (“[A] landowner has an absolute right to have his land
in its natural state laterally supported by the lands of adjoining landowners. . . . There is,
however, no such absolute right to lateral support of buildings. Liability for damage to
buildings resulting from the loss of lateral support must be based upon the negligence of the
adjoining landowner in carrying on the activity which occasioned the loss of lateral support.”).
40

Callender, 18 Mass. at 430.

41

Id. at 437.

42

Id. at 439.

43

Id. at 438.

44

Id. at 439.
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The buyers of those lots could decide for themselves whether the city’s growth
might someday warrant changes to the road and price their purchase offers
accordingly.45 Similarly, owners of property abutting a road had to think about
whether the grade might be changed and locate their buildings accordingly.46
The Callender court realized that its market-based approach might not always
account for the effects of future grade changes: “although, theoretically, all this may
be considered as determined when the street is originally laid out, yet practically
there may be cases where this just provision has been overlooked.”47 This
realization prompted the court to remark that the legislature might enact a statute
providing for an adjudication (and compensation) when long-existing streets are
raised or lowered to the detriment of abutting houses.48 Nonetheless, under the
common law, the surveyor of highways was plainly not liable for damages, for his
acts occurred on public property and under color of a statute that authorized him to
do the work.49
B. Sharing the Streets with Publicly-Authorized Users: The 1839 Decision in
Lexington and Ohio Rail Road Co. v. Applegate
Another kind of access-related litigation began when local governments decided
to let railroads operate in public streets. Railroads provided an important
transportation service to the public, yet they were privately owned, and their rails
and road-beds physically occupied part of the public space. The presence of railroad
structures and trains changed how the street could be used, potentially to the
detriment of nearby properties. But did owners of property abutting a street have
any legally-protected right in it to assert against the railroad’s municipallyauthorized use?
Steam railroads were cutting-edge technology in 183850 when the Lexington and
Ohio Rail Road Company began carrying passengers and freight along Main Street
in Louisville, Kentucky.51 Shortly after the railroad began operating, however, a
group of property owners and tenants obtained an injunction against it, convincing
the equity court that the railroad was a nuisance that unlawfully encroached on their
private property rights in the street.52
45

Id. at 438.

46

Id. at 438-39.

47

Id. at 440.

48
Id. at 441. The Massachusetts legislature later passed a law that did provide
compensation to owners whose property was damaged by the alteration of a road grade. See
Morse v. Stocker, 83 Mass. 150, 154-55 (1861).
49

Callender, 18 Mass. at 441.

50

The B&O railway, generally regarded as the nation’s first, broke ground in 1828.
JAMES A. WARD, RAILROADS AND THE CHARACTER OF AMERICA 1820-1887 16 (1986). By
1837 there were 1,498 operating miles of rail line in the United States. Id. at 13.
51

Lexington & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Applegate, 38 Ky. 289, 290 (1839). Lexington appears
to be the first American case dealing with an abutter’s right of access to the street. Frank M.
Covey, Jr., Frontage Roads: To Compensate or Not to Compensate, 56 NW. U. L. REV. 587,
588 n.11 (1961).
52

Lexington, 38 Ky. at 291.
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On review, the Kentucky Court of Appeals agreed that the owners of property
abutting Main Street did have a property right in the street: “a private right of the
nature of an incorporeal hereditament, legally attached to their contiguous ground
. . . without which their property would be comparatively of but little value, and
would never have been bought by them.”53
Even if the owners of property along the street suffered some inconvenience or
loss, however, the court of appeals decided that they had no right to an injunction or
damages if the railroad’s use of the street was consistent with the purposes for which
the street was established.54 As the court explained, the abutting owners “purchased
their property, and must hold it . . . subject to any consequences that may result,
whether advantageously or disadvantageously, from any public and authorized use of
the streets, in any mode promotive of, and consistent with the purposes of
establishing them as common highways in town, and compatible with the reasonable
enjoyment of them by all others entitled thereto.”55
The Lexington court went on to say that if, in a future case, there was satisfactory
proof that a railroad’s use of the street “encroaches on any private right, or obstructs
the reasonable use and enjoyment of the street, by any person who has an equal right
to the use of it,” then the court would “be ready to enjoin all such wrongful
appropriation of the highway.”56 Since the record before it did not show that the
railway had “unreasonably abridged” any public or private right in or use of Main
Street,57 however, the court of appeals reversed, ordering that the injunction be
dissolved.58
C. Balancing Private Property Rights and the Public Right
to Improve the Streets: The Ohio Approach
Early nineteenth century street improvements intended for horse and carriage,
such as regrading, were a normal characteristic of municipal growth and progress.59
As the Callender case illustrated, such public betterments could work to the
disadvantage of people who bought lots and built improvements with reference to
the street as it was when they came to it. Yet virtually all courts, when confronted
with an abutting property owner’s suit for damages, agreed that no common-law
claim existed—any remedy would have to be provided by the legislature.
The main exception to this rule was in Ohio. Beginning in 1846, the Ohio
Supreme Court recognized an abutter’s common-law claim for damages against a
municipal corporation even if the city used proper care when changing the grade of a

53

Id. at 294. An “incorporeal hereditament” is an intangible right capable of being
inherited. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 726 (6th ed. 1990).
54

Lexington, 38 Ky. at 301.

55

Id. at 301-02.

56

Id. at 310.

57

Id. at 306.

58

Id. at 311.

59

Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. 418, 426 (1823).
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street.60 In its subsequent, more comprehensive opinion in Crawford v. Village of
Delaware, the Ohio court explicitly stated that it was balancing the private right of
access against the public right to improve the street.61 Interestingly, though, the
Crawford court did not attach this right to the land next to the street—as suggested
by the Kentucky court in the Lexington case—but to the buildings erected on that
land.62
Significantly, the Ohio court framed the issue in terms of an established street
grade and a lot owner who put up buildings in a reasonable relation to that grade,
which the city later changed for the public convenience “so as to substantially and
materially injure the buildings.”63 Under those circumstances, the Ohio court
explained, the lot owner’s “use of the street as an incident to his permanent erections
[and] the private rights of the owner, inherent in and incident to the erections upon
the lot, are invaded.”64 The injury to the buildings, in the court’s view, was “as
positive and substantial an injury to private property, and as direct an invasion of
private right, incident to the lot, as if the erections upon the lot were taken for public
use.”65
The court carefully confined its holding to structures built “in good faith” and
“with a view to the established grade.”66 The owner of an unimproved lot had no
claim for damages.67 And if the street grade was not established, then a lot owner
had to use reasonable care to anticipate what the established grade might be, and
locate any buildings accordingly.68 But once the public had “defined the interests
and improvements necessary” for a highway by establishing grades, creating
roadside drainage swales, installing culverts, and the like, then the owners of
abutting lots had “the right to assume this exercise of authority as a final decision of
the wants of the public, and to make their improvements in reference to it.”69

60

Crawford v. Village of Delaware, 7 Ohio St. 459, 464-65 (1857) (citing McComb v.
Town of Akron, 15 Ohio 474 (1846)). The Ohio court acknowledged that its position was
unique and in direct conflict with decisional law in the United States and England. Id. at 465.
61

Id. at 469-70.

62

Id. at 470.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id. at 470-71.

66

Id. at 470.

67

Id.

68

Id. A landowner had no claim for damages if alteration to a road made it less
convenient for travel but did not directly impair “access to the road from the improvements on
his land.” Jackson v. Jackson, 16 Ohio St. 163, 163 (1865).
69

Cincinnati & Spring Grove Ave. St. Ry. Co. v. Inc. Village of Cumminsville, 14 Ohio
St. 523, 547 (1863). The court continued: “If any mistake is made, it is the mistake of the
public authorities, and cannot be corrected at the expense of those who have acted and
expended their money on the faith of its being final.” Id.
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D. Statutory Changes in the Late 1800s
The Callender, Lexington, and Crawford decisions, all of which preceded the
Civil War, represent some of the earliest judicial efforts to resolve difficulties that
arose when new transportation technologies and new public works impinged upon
older property uses.
Other efforts to resolve those difficulties were legislative. As the nineteenth
century went on, some states enacted statutes requiring payment for damage to the
value of abutting properties resulting from a grade change after the municipal
corporation had officially established the grade of a street.70 The process to establish
a permanent grade could be a formal matter, involving public notice, a hearing, and
recording of the grade line.71 Once the “permanent” grade was established, the act of
recording vested in the owners of abutting lands a right to be compensated if a future
change to the grade caused damage to the value of their properties.72
Absent some enactment to the contrary, however, the common law doctrine
precluding compensation for damages consequential to “right use of property already
belonging to the public” still held sway. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in an
1878 decision in Transportation Co. v. Chicago:
The doctrine, however it may at times appear to be at variance with
natural justice, rests upon the soundest legal reason. The State holds its
highways in trust for the public. Improvements made by its direction or
by its authority are its acts, and the ultimate responsibility, of course,
should rest upon it. But it is the prerogative of the State to be exempt
from coercion by suit, except by its own consent. . . . The remedy,
therefore, for a consequential injury resulting from the State’s action
through its agents, if there be any, must be that, and that only, which the
legislature shall give. It does not exist at common law.73
Because there was no legislative remedy then in effect in Illinois,74 the Court
concluded that the Northern Transportation Company had no valid claim against the

70

See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Nagle, 15 N.E. 1, 2 (Ind. 1888) (“[N]o action will lie
unless the grade has once been established by the [municipal] corporate authorities.”).
71
See Kelly v. Mayor of Baltimore, 3 A. 594, 596-97 (Md. 1886) (describing Baltimore’s
procedure for establishing or changing the grade of a street).
72
See, e.g., Moore v. City of Atlanta, 70 Ga. 611, 613 (1883) (describing statutory
procedure for recording an established grade).
73

Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 641-42 (1878). Like the Massachusetts court in
Callender, the Supreme Court reasoned that the city’s power over its streets was the same
whether it held them in fee or by easement:
It is immaterial whether the fee of the street was in the State or in the city or in the
adjoining lot-holders. If in the latter, the State had an easement to repair and improve
the street over its entire length and breadth, to adapt it to easy and safe passage.
Id. at 641.
74
The Supreme Court was applying Illinois law as it existed before the 1870 constitutional
amendment that required compensation when private property was “damaged” for public use.
Id. at 642.
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City of Chicago for interruption of street and river access to its property during
construction of the LaSalle Street tunnel under the Chicago River.
The many jurists who had considered and rejected similar claims, moreover,
were not acting blindly, as the Supreme Court emphasized:
The decisions to which we have referred were made in view of Magna
Charta and the restriction to be found in the constitution of every State,
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation being made. But acts done in the proper exercise of
governmental powers, and not directly encroaching upon private property,
though their consequences may impair its use, are universally held not to
be a taking within the meaning of the constitutional provision. They do
not entitle the owner of such property to compensation from the State or
its agents, or give him any right of action. This is supported by an
immense weight of authority.75
E. “No Easement of Access . . . As Against any Improvement of the Street for the
Purpose of Adapting it to Public Travel”: The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1906 Decision
in Sauer v. City of New York
By the early twentieth century, courts had seen many years of litigation over
abutting owners’ rights in a public highway. Much of this litigation involved
railroads in the streets. As the Lexington case illustrates, since at least the 1830s
public authorities had been allowing railroads to lay their tracks in existing streets.76
These decisions were meant to foster a synergistic development of rail transportation
and urban commercial areas.77 Yet a railroad in the street might interfere with the
street’s ability to provide access to already-developed properties.78 Accordingly,
between about 1850 and 1910 many “great court battles” were fought over claims
that a public roadway had been converted into “a right of way for mass transit
systems at the expense of its street functions.”79
75

Id. Ohio’s differing rule was an anomaly noted by the Court: “The decisions in Ohio, so
far as we know, are the solitary exceptions.” Id. at 641. Contemporary writers took the same
view of the rule’s wide acceptance. 10 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
1124-28 (David S. Garland & Lucius P. McGehee eds., 2d ed. 1899) (noting that, except in
Ohio, a “change of grade in streets made by a municipality, if made in accordance with
statute, is not such an injury to adjoining property as to require compensation to be made to
owners unless there is a statute rendering the municipality liable therefor,” and this rule
applied even when the grade change interfered with access).
76

Lexington & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Applegate, 38 Ky. 289, 290-91 (1839).

77

Id. at 307.

78

See, e.g., Kan., Neb. & Dakota Ry. Co. v. McAfee, 21 P. 1053 (1889) (holding that fivefoot railroad embankment, built eighteen feet from the property line in front of a boarding
house, left enough room for street traffic, so the owner had no claim against the railroad;
owner did have a claim for a switch and “wye” track built seven feet from the fence, as the
remaining street area was too narrow to provide reasonable access to the property).
79

ROSS D. NETHERTON, CONTROL OF HIGHWAY ACCESS 50 (1963). Netherton observed
that the cases dealing with non-highway use “are still good law” but “seldom applied in the
courts for the simple reason that nonhighway uses rarely arise in modern practice.” Id.
Instead, “the current demands of vehicular transportation have so taxed the capacity of the
available space in the streets that there is no longer any place for facilities which do not
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How the battles came out often depended on how much the railroad interfered
with normal use of the roadway space. A local street railway, running on rails
placed at or near grade and sharing the roadway surface with other vehicles, often
was viewed as just another street use.80 Its presence in the street might be no more
obtrusive than a series of horse-drawn vehicles carrying the same number of
passengers.81 On the other hand, if the railroad ran on an embankment, then the
public could no longer use the raised part of the roadway—a practical form of
exclusion that some called “‘a perversion of the street from street uses.’”82 Because
the interference with access did not result from a “legitimate street improvement,” it
might be considered a compensable taking of the right or easement of access
appurtenant to land abutting the street.83 In Callender’s descriptive phrase, the
railroad embankment was not a “right use of property already belonging to the
public.”
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1906 decision in Sauer v. City of New York highlights
the critical distinction courts drew between railroad uses and true street
improvements.84 Relying on law that had developed in railroad cases, Sauer sought
damages for loss of access after the city constructed a viaduct in the street in front of
his built-up property.85 The viaduct did impair access to Sauer’s property, and if it
had been put there because of a railroad, Sauer likely would have had a good claim.86
Railroads, however, were not allowed to use the viaduct, which was “devoted to
ordinary traffic by teams, vehicles and pedestrians.”87

contribute directly to expanding the traffic-carrying capacity or efficiency of the street.” Id.
Notably, too, the railroad cases were “distinguishable from the bulk of . . . eminent domain
cases, in that the offending activities were said to be beyond the purposes for which the streets
were dedicated, instead of furthering road purposes, as, for example, a change of grade or
regulation of driveway openings would do.” WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK, NONTRESPASSORY
TAKINGS IN EMINENT DOMAIN 24 (1977).
80

Canastota Knife Co. v. Newington Tramway Co., 36 A. 1107, 1108-09 (Conn. 1897).
New York was the only state that considered an electric street railway to be a new servitude.
Id. at 1108.
81

Lexington, 38 Ky. at 308-09.

82

Sauer v. City of New York, 206 U.S. 536, 545 (1907) (internal citation omitted). In an
1889 decision the Mississippi Supreme Court held that because a “railroad requires a
permanent structure in the street, the use of which is private and exclusive,” its exclusion of
“all ordinary travel” was inconsistent with “the legitimate uses of a public street.” Theobold
v. Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Ry. Co., 6 So. 230, 230 (1889). One judge stressed that
the railroad at issue in Theobold was built to connect distant points and merely passed through
the city of Vicksburg, using the street to lay its track. If the railroad lay within the city, and
was “constructed and used as an ordinary street railway,” then “possibly a different question
would arise.” Id. (note following case, LexisNexis).
83

Sauer, 206 U.S. at 544-48.

84

Id. at 545.

85

Id. at 540.

86

Id. at 542-43.

87

Id. at 543.
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Because the viaduct was restricted to ordinary street uses, Sauer was out of luck:
the state court held that he “had no easement of access . . . as against any
improvement of the street for the purpose of adapting it to public travel.”88 As the
Supreme Court put it, the state court “decided that the property alleged to have been
injured”—namely, an easement of access to the street from the Sauer property—“did
not exist.”89
The Supreme Court also observed that the state court’s rejection of a takings
claim, when the interference with access resulted from a street improvement made
for ordinary vehicular travel, appeared “to be in full accord with the decisions of all
other courts in which the same question has arisen.”90 Despite their many
disagreements in railroad cases, nearly all the state courts did agree on one point: if
public authorities improved a street for purposes of general public travel, then under
the common law the owner of abutting land was not entitled to damages for
impairment of access.91 As the Sauer court concluded:
“The doctrine of the courts everywhere, both in England and in this
country (unless Ohio and Kentucky are excepted), is that so long as there
is no application of the street to purposes other than those of a highway,
any establishment or change of grade made lawfully, and not negligently
performed, does not impose an additional servitude upon the street, and
hence is not within the constitutional inhibition against taking private
property without compensation, and is not the basis of an action for
damages, unless there be an express statute to that effect.”92
According to the Supreme Court in Sauer, then, at the beginning of the twentieth
century there was no common law property right that an owner of abutting land
could assert when a public project, undertaken within the existing public right-ofway to improve the road for ordinary travel, interfered with access between that
property and the road. But, as the following part of this Article will describe, the
common law was not the only game in town.
F. State Constitutional Changes and the Law of Access at the Dawn of the
Automobile Age
We have seen that, in 1878 and again in 1906, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
that an impairment of access to abutting property, caused by an improvement made
within a street to serve the purposes of general public travel, was not a taking of a
property right. As the Court’s Sauer decision remarked:
The state courts have uniformly held that the erection over a street of an
elevated viaduct, intended for general public travel and not devoted to the
exclusive use of a private transportation corporation, is a legitimate street
improvement equivalent to a change of grade; and that, as in the case of a
change of grade, an owner of land abutting on the street is not entitled to
88

Id. at 542.

89

Id.

90

Id. at 543-44.

91

Id. at 544.

92

Id. at 545 (quoting Willis v. Winona City, 60 N.W. 814, 815 (Minn. 1894)).
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damages for the impairment of access to his land and the lessening of the
circulation of light and air over it.93
This uniformity of holdings was significant as far as it went, for within the realm
of the common law, abutting property owners whose access was impaired by a
legitimate street improvement—by a “right use of property already belonging to the
public”—had no claim for damages. In effect, whatever right they had to get
between their property and the street was subordinate to the public’s right to improve
the street for general public travel. Courts recognized that this rule might produce
harsh results in some cases, particularly when valuable buildings laid out to conform
to the previous street grade ended up far below (or far above) the traveled way, but
the common law did not provide a remedy.
The near-unanimity in common law doctrine, however, masked a broad popular
movement for change. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, public works
projects became increasingly larger, and the adverse effects they sometimes had on
already-developed properties could not be ignored. Consequential damages from
street grading were “especially widespread in Chicago, which was built on a swamp.
Street raising projects in Chicago in the mid-nineteenth century, covering the entire
downtown area and many nearby neighborhoods, had buried the first floors of many
existing buildings.”94 This problem, along with widespread concern over abusive
practices by railroads, led Illinois to amend its constitution to state that “‘private
property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.’”95
These same concerns “caught the imagination of constitutional conventions in
many other states as well. By 1880, a mere ten years after Illinois pioneered the
‘taking or damage’ clause, eleven other states had adopted similar constitutional
provisions. By 1912, twenty-five of the forty-eight states had a ‘taking or damage’
provision . . . .”96
The constitutional changes effectively divided the states into two broad camps.
One group required compensation only when private property was “taken” for public
use. Although these states may have recognized a property right of access to an
abutting street, it was a subordinate one:
But as all streets are established primarily for the public use and the
general good, the right of the public is paramount to the right of the
individual. And so the private rights of access, light and air are held and
enjoyed subject to the paramount right of the public to use and improve
the street for the purposes of a highway. And as these private rights are
thus subject to the right of the public to use and improve as a highway, it
follows that, when such uses or improvements are made, no private right
is interfered with and consequently no private property is taken.97
93

Id. at 544.

94

Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in NineteenthCentury State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57, 119 (1999).
95

Id. at 118 (emphasis added).

96

Id. at 119-20.

97

Barrett v. Union Bridge Co., 243 P. 93, 94 (Or. 1926) (internal citation omitted). As the
Barrett court pointedly observed, the Oregon constitution requires just compensation when
private property is taken for public use, but “[t]he word ‘damaged’ is not used.” Id. at 93.
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The other group, which required compensation when property was “damaged”
for public use, replaced the common law rule with one that more closely resembled
Ohio’s. Cases applying this new constitutional provision were “nearly uniform in
holding [that] . . . where a grade is once established by public authority, and private
property is improved with reference thereto, a subsequent alteration or change in that
grade to the damage of abutting property renders the municipality liable.”98
If the grade of a road had not yet been established, however, the decisions were
not so uniform.99 Some courts reasoned that the constitutional change entirely
abrogated the common law rule; accordingly, they required payment of damages
even for the first grade of a road.100 Others, however, found liability only when an
established grade had been altered, reasoning that abutting lot owners should expect
a road’s original, natural surface to be improved when public travel required it.101
Courts limited the sweep of this new rule in other important ways, as well. To be
constitutionally cognizable, the “damage” had to result from some direct physical
disturbance of a right—regulation alone would not suffice.102 And the right had to
be one enjoyed “in connection with” the property.103 This meant that a damage
claim must relate to access between the road and the property: a change to the street
network causing a loss of convenient accessibility lacked the requisite connection
because everyone using the affected road experienced it, whether they owned
property there or not.104 Finally, benefits resulting from the public project might
partly or even totally offset any injury.105 For example, a street grade change might
98

Sallden v. City of Little Falls, 113 N.W. 884, 884 (Minn. 1907).

99

Id.

100

Id. at 885.

101

See, e.g., City of Mangum v. Todd, 141 P. 266, 269 (Okla. 1914); Gray v. Salt Lake
City, 138 P. 1177, 1182-84 (Utah 1914).
102

City of Mangum, 141 P. at 267 (citing 4 JOHN FORREST DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 1684-85 (5th ed. 1911)); see also Rigney v. Chicago,
102 Ill. 64, 80-81 (1881) (“In all cases, to warrant a recovery it must appear there has been
some direct physical disturbance of a right, either public or private, which the plaintiff enjoys
in connection with his property, and which gives to it an additional value, and that by reason
of such disturbance he has sustained a special damage with respect to his property in excess of
that sustained by the public generally.”).
103

Rigney, 102 Ill. at 81.

104

Courts drew an important distinction between “general” and “special” damages in
access cases. If a transportation project made travel to and from the property less
convenient—for example, by blocking a street some distance away from the property—courts
normally found no legally-cognizable damage, even in states that had constitutions requiring
compensation when property was damaged for public use. See, e.g., Rude v. City of St. Louis,
6 S.W. 257 (Mo. 1887). Under those circumstances, the damages were general: they were
suffered by everyone using the street, though perhaps in a greater degree by those who lived
or owned property there. Id. If the obstruction made it difficult to get between the property
and the road, by contrast, the ensuing damage was special—peculiar to that property—and
therefore a compensable form of damage. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Greeley, Salt Lake & Pac. Ry.
Co., 22 P. 814 (Colo. 1889).
105
Schroeder v. Joliet, 59 N.E. 550, 551 (Ill. 1901) (“The rule has long been settled that if
property is actually taken and applied to a public use this provision of the constitution requires
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make a residential property become suitable for commercial use, and if so, that
benefit would be set off against damage to the existing use.106
Accordingly, at the beginning of the automobile age, the “default rule” still held
that disruption of access to and from property abutting a road, caused by an
improvement built for purposes of public travel within the existing right-of-way, was
not a taking of a property right. Some states had enacted statutes providing for
compensation under those circumstances; many adopted constitutional amendments
requiring payment when certain factors (such as alteration of established grade,
direct physical disturbance, and special damages not offset by benefits) were present.
But regulation of access, especially where motor vehicles could conflict with
pedestrians or other traffic, presented a new set of circumstances.107 And so it is to
those matters that we will turn next.
III. THE GROWTH OF AUTOMOBILE USE AND THE BEGINNINGS OF ACCESS
REGULATION
In 1904, two years before the Supreme Court’s Sauer decision, there were 55,290
registered cars and trucks in the United States. 108 By 1910, four years after Sauer,
the number rose to 468,500.109 A decade later it was almost twenty times greater:
9,239,161 vehicles were registered in 1920.110 The use of automobiles spread so
rapidly that, while only one of every sixty families owned an automobile in 1915, by
1925 one family in eight had a car.111
that it shall be paid for in money, regardless of benefits to other land of the same owner of
which he is not deprived. Where property is not actually taken by the public for its use but the
question is whether it has been damaged for public use, the ordinary rule for the determination
of that question is applied, and if the market value of the property is not decreased there is no
damage and there can be no recovery.”).
106

See, e.g., Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161, 169 (1888) (explaining that even though
construction of viaduct meant property was no longer suitable for use as a coal yard, “that
would not be material if it can be rented or sold at as good a price for other purposes”); Moore
v. City of Atlanta, 70 Ga. 611, 614 (1883) (explaining that no recovery would be had if
improved accessibility resulting from the street grading project “equaled the inconvenience or
discomfort [caused to] the home as a mere residence”); Brown v. City of Seattle, 31 P. 313,
314 (Wash. 1892) (“[D]amages are now recoverable by the owners of land abutting upon
streets and highways, for any permanent injury inflicted upon such abutting lands, by any
material change of grade or obstruction to the abutter's access, where the damages thus
inflicted exceed the benefits derived from the grading or other improvement.”).
107
One writer has observed that in modern access cases, the “damaged” provision has
significance only when access is impaired by a change of grade: “In other areas of access loss,
the compensation question does not in general turn on the presence vel non of ‘damaged,’
though in some opinions the word seems to predispose to a result more liberal to the
landowner than otherwise might have been.” William B. Stoebuck, The Property Right of
Access Versus the Power of Eminent Domain, 47 TEX. L. REV. 733, 758 (1969).
108

Spencer Miller, Jr., History of the Modern Highway in the United States, in HIGHWAYS
OUR NATIONAL LIFE 88, 95 (Jean Labatut & Wheaton J. Lane eds., 1950). Ten years
earlier, only four experimental vehicles were in use. Id.

IN

109

Id.

110

Id.

111

PHILLIP F. SCHEWE, THE GRID 78 (2007).
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The thoroughfares that these automobiles shared with horse-drawn vehicles were
not unlike today’s streets. At the center of the street, municipal authorities would
leave open “an unobstructed driveway of ample width for the passage of teams,” but
the edges of the right-of-way could be used for other public purposes, such as
sidewalks, curbs, gutters, fire hydrants, and plots of grass and trees.112 A city or
village also might “under reasonable regulations and conditions, permit private
driveways to be built from the lands of the abutting owners to the driveway of the
street.”113 And when a private driveway was permitted, the municipality could “bend
the line of curbing in towards the sidewalk” to “limit the private driveway and
prevent teams from passing over the grass or running against the trees.”114
Since a municipal corporation had discretion to permit, under reasonable
regulations and conditions, the construction of a driveway connecting private
property to the traveled part of the street, did it also have discretion to deny it? As
the following discussion will show, the results of the earliest decisions answering
that question were mixed.
A. Access may be Regulated but not Denied Altogether:
The 1910 Goodfellow Tire Decision
In perhaps the first driveway permit case, decided in 1910, the Michigan
Supreme Court considered a boulevard statute that stated: “Carriage or drive ways
and foot walks connecting with any premises adjoining the boulevard . . . shall be
allowed only on a permit issued” by the commissioner of parks and boulevards.115
This statute, according to Detroit’s commissioner, allowed him to deny the
Goodfellow Tire Company a permit to construct any driveway to Grand
Boulevard.116 Without a driveway to the boulevard, however, the only way vehicles
or pedestrians could reach Goodfellow Tire’s property was through an alley.117
Against the commissioner’s claim that the power to permit access included the
power to deny it entirely, the Michigan court quoted a legal encyclopedia’s
statements that an abutter has a right of “‘free and unimpeded ingress and egress to
and from his property for himself and animals and goods’” and “‘an indefeasible
right of access to and from their property to the street.’”118 The commissioner, by
112

Dougherty v. Trs. of Horseheads, 53 N.E. 799, 800 (N.Y. 1899).

113

Id.

114

Id.

115

Goodfellow Tire Co. v. Comm’r of Parks & Boulevards of Detroit, 128 N.W. 410, 412
(Mich. 1910) (internal citation omitted).
116

Id.

117

Goodfellow Tire owned the rear half of several lots at the corner of Woodward Avenue
and Grand Boulevard. The front half of the lots, facing Woodward Avenue, was owned by
someone else and occupied by a block of stores, precluding access to Woodward. Id. at 410.
If no driveway was allowed to Grand Boulevard, then vehicular access would have been
possible only by way of the alley behind the lots. Id.
118

Id. at 412 (quoting WILLIAM MACK, 28 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 856-57,
863 (1908)). The quoted sections deal with the powers of municipal corporations. It is
difficult to square the encyclopedia’s sweeping declarations with the cases it cited, the very
first of which described a presumption against compensation when a municipal authority
modifies an existing street to further the public’s use of it for ordinary highway purposes.
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contrast, had not shown the court “a case holding that an abutting owner may be
deprived of ingress and egress by means of a driveway to and from his property to
the highway in front of it.”119
Notably, too, the statute giving the commissioner authority to permit driveways
specified his power to determine how they would be built: from this, the court
inferred legislative intent that a permit “shall be allowed upon suitable regulations
and conditions.”120 Accordingly, the court directed the commissioner to grant
Goodfellow Tire a driveway permit, “subject to reasonable regulations and
conditions as to number, location, plan of construction, and material used therein.”121
Interestingly, in City of Detroit v. Grand Trunk Railroad, a case decided the
same day as Goodfellow Tire, the Michigan Supreme Court reaffirmed that
consequential injuries, resulting from a separation of grades that was done in
accordance with statutory authority, do not constitute a taking of private property.122
As Grand Trunk reasoned, while a city might be liable for acts taken without
legislative authority, street improvements or changes made with legislative authority
did not impose any liability “unless the legislature so declares.”123 As the court put
it: “It seems to be unnecessary to say that the legislature has complete control over
the highways of the State, that what is done in and upon them by lawful authority
cannot be considered a nuisance, and that consequential injuries resulting from what
is so done are damnum absque injuria.”124
Accordingly, Goodfellow Tire is best understood as a decision regarding the
extent of a municipal commissioner’s discretion under a particular permitting statute.
Whether the Michigan legislature could have empowered the commissioner to allow
vehicular access through the alley only, and to deny direct access to the boulevard,
was not decided.
B. Access to an Abutting Street or to Each Abutting Street:
The Brownlow and Wood Cases
The expanding use of automobiles in the United States brought with it an equally
growing demand for fuel and the rapid development of gasoline retailing.125 Motor
fuel retailers quickly saw the advantages of a street-corner location: a site with
WILLIAM MACK, 28 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE, 863 n.24 (1908) (citing City of
Denver v. Bayer, 2 P. 6 (Colo. 1883)). In Bayer, the Colorado Supreme Court construed the
new “taken or damaged” constitutional language as applying to a railroad in the street, but
indicated that it should not affect most true street projects: “[W]e think that for injuries caused
by a reasonable change or improvement of the street, by the [municipal] council, in a careful
manner, the abutting owner should not recover.” Bayer, 2 P. at 13.
119

Goodfellow Tire, 128 N.W. at 412.

120

Id. at 412-13.

121

Id. at 413.

122

In re City of Detroit, 128 N.W. 250, 253 (Mich. 1910). The court decided Goodfellow
Tire and City of Detroit on November 11, 1910.
123

Id.

124

Id. The Latin phrase means “loss, hurt, or harm without injury in the legal sense.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 393 (6th ed. 1990).
125

JOHN A. JAKLE & KEITH A. SCULLE, THE GAS STATION IN AMERICA 49-52, 58 (1994).
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driveways to both streets provided many opportunities for cars to enter and exit the
filling station.126 But easy access to the site would be useless if there were few
customers, so locations on heavily-traveled streets were preferred.
Yet this need for traffic brought its own set of problems. In that day, busy streets
had busy sidewalks, and autos crossing them posed a hazard to pedestrians.127
Municipal governments also saw that vehicles entering and exiting gas stations could
interfere with the flow of traffic on the street.128 These concerns sometimes led
authorities to allow vehicles to cross the sidewalk on the least-used of the two
abutting streets only, and to close off any driveways to the busier street.129
Predictably, this kind of interference with customer traffic sometimes led to
litigation.
The Brownlow case, decided in 1921, dealt with a filling station at the corner of
Fourteenth and Irving Streets in the District of Columbia.130 Fourteenth was a
business street that had “a great deal of travel,” and concern for pedestrian safety led
the District to close the driveway there, leaving the station with two entrances on the
other street, Irving, which was residential in character and had less traffic.131
The company obtained an injunction, convincing a court that the Irving Street
entrances were not sufficient to accommodate the filling station’s customer traffic
and, moreover, that “the right to maintain the Fourteenth street entrance is a valuable
incorporeal right attached to the lot” that the District could not take away without
paying just compensation.132
Citing various authorities, including Goodfellow Tire, the appeals court agreed
that the District had a right “to make reasonable regulations for the use of driveways
across sidewalks.”133 But, the Brownlow court continued, “regulation is one thing,
126

Id. at 210.

127

See, e.g., Oriental Oil Co. v. City of San Antonio, 208 S.W. 177, 181 (Tex. Civ. App.
1918) (“[T]he conclusion that driving autos across the sidewalks will increase the hazard to
pedestrians on those sidewalks is unquestionably true.”).
128

Id. (“The conclusion that street traffic will be blocked [by vehicles going to and from
the gas station] is not clear. The congestion at the intersection is due, primarily, to currents of
traffic passing each other at right angles. . . . It does not necessarily follow that to turn out of
Travis street delays the current; on the contrary, it may hasten it by removing from it—
moving out can be effected as quickly as moving forward.”).
129

In the Oriental Oil case, the City of San Antonio enacted legislation declaring a gas
station in the busy area at the corner of Travis and St. Mary’s streets to be a public nuisance
and prohibiting any vehicles from crossing sidewalks in that area. Id. at 178. The Texas court
recognized a property owner’s “inherent right to drive over the sidewalks for ingress and
egress with vehicles for his private use and for the conduct of his business, provided that the
use thus made of the sidewalks is reasonable,” and that the ordinance would eliminate that
right. Id. at 181. But a nuisance is not a reasonable use: “If the conduct of the business is
determined to be a menace to pedestrians or a nuisance to street traffic, the city cannot be
estopped to abate it.” Id.
130

Brownlow v. O’Donoghue Bros., Inc., 276 F. 636 (D.C. Cir. 1921).

131

Id. at 636-37.

132

Id. at 637.

133

Id.
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and prohibition is another.”134 Depriving the filling station of any vehicular access to
Fourteenth Street, in the court’s view, exceeded the bounds of permissible
regulation.135
And the station’s two remaining driveways to Irving Street did not make the
regulation any more reasonable: “It needs no argument to show that an entrance to a
place of business such as [the company] conducts from a street over which there is
much travel is far more valuable than one from a street where the traffic is light.”136
With this blended concept of access to the street and access to traffic in mind, the
appeals court concluded that the company’s “right to access to and from Fourteenth
street is a property right, which, though subject to legitimate regulation, cannot be
taken from it without just compensation.”137
Soon afterward the Virginia Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion,
holding that the owner of a corner lot might be allowed access to just one abutting
street.138 The 1927 decision in Wood v. City of Richmond involved a gas station built
after the lot owner obtained a permit to construct driveways to Leigh Street and to
Thirty-Fourth Street.139 A few months later, however, the city ordered removal of
the Thirty-Fourth Street drive, stating that it violated the city’s zoning ordinance.140
A chancery court entered an order temporarily restraining the city from removing
the drive.141 The city moved to dissolve this injunction, contending that the permit
had been issued without due consideration of the large volume of pedestrian and
vehicular traffic on Thirty-Fourth Street which, in the opinion of the city’s public
works director, made the driveway a safety hazard.142 The circuit court granted the
motion, dissolved the injunction, and dismissed the case.143
On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court the property owner, Wood, asserted a
right of access to each street abutting his lot. Wood did not deny that the city had
police power to control the traffic on its streets but contended that, as an abutter, he
had “the right of access to his lot from Thirty-fourth street, as well as from Leigh
street, and that such right is absolute and inherent.”144 Relying on a legal
encyclopedia, Wood argued that, “‘An abutting land owner on a public highway has
a special right of easement and use in the public road for access purposes, and this is

134

Id.

135

Id. at 637-38.

136

Id. at 637.

137

Id. at 638.

138

Wood v. City of Richmond, 138 S.E. 560, 561 (Va. 1927).

139

Id.

140

Id.

141

Id.

142

Id.

143

Id.

144

Id.
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a property right which cannot be damaged or taken from him without just
compensation.’”145
The Virginia Supreme Court was not convinced that Wood had a right in the
street superior to the public:
While conceding the correctness of the proposition that an abutter has an
easement in the public road which amounts to a property right, we are of
the opinion that the exercise of this right is subordinate to the right of the
municipality, derived by legislative authority, to so control the use of the
streets as to promote the safety, comfort, health and general welfare of the
public.146
Given the evidence of heavy traffic on Thirty-Fourth Street and the presence of a
bus stop there, the Virginia court concluded that the city had authority to close the
driveway, and that its decision to do so was a reasonable exercise of the police
power.147
C. Locating the Boundary Between Individual and Public Interests:
The Pennsylvania Access Cases
In 1913, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted a statute authorizing cities “‘to
prevent . . . the passage of any vehicles drawn or self-propelled over and across
sidewalks.”148 Twenty years later, the City of Reading offered this statute as its
authority to enact ordinances prohibiting all private driveways within a nine-block
area along Penn Street, one of the city’s busiest thoroughfares.149 These ordinances,
which supported an earlier permit revocation, prevented the Farmers-Kissinger
Market House from building a driveway across the sidewalk from Penn Street,
through its market building, and to its parking garage on Cherry Street.150
Significantly, the market and the garage already had vehicular access to Cherry
Street.151
145

Id. at 562 (quoting WILLIAM MACK, WILLIAM B. HALE & DONALD J. KISER, 29 CORPUS
JURIS 547 (1922)). Interestingly, Mack edited the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure quoted
by the Michigan Supreme Court in Goodfellow Tire. Goodfellow Tire Co. v. Comm’r of Parks
& Boulevards of Detroit, 128 N.W. 410, 412 (Mich. 1910). Thomas Cooley, perhaps the bestknown treatise writer of the period, took a middle position. In Cooley’s view, a proper
exercise of governmental power that did not directly encroach on the property of an
individual, such as a change in the grade of a city street that diminished the value of adjoining
lots, was not a taking. THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 781-84 (1903).
But if the action deprived the owner of the ordinary use of his property by, for example,
preventing any access from the lot to the highway, it was equivalent to a taking and entitled
the owner to compensation. Id. at 785 n.3, 787-88 n.2.
146

Wood, 138 S.E. at 562.

147

Id. at 563.

148

Farmers-Kissinger Mkt. House Co. v. Reading, 165 A. 398, 400 (Pa. 1933) (internal
citation omitted).
149

Id. at 399-400.

150

Id.

151

Id. at 402.
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had no problem concluding that Reading’s
ordinances were within the city’s statutory authority.152 Even so, the company
contended that the city’s exercise of that power was unconstitutional, depriving it of
a valuable property right—the right of access—without due process of law.153
The court readily agreed that the ordinances deprived the company of “a valuable
interest or privilege” by preventing construction of a driveway across the sidewalk
on Penn Street.154 But it rejected any idea that the company’s access right was
paramount: “Community life requires some curtailment of the individual’s freedom
in the use of his property.”155 Quoting the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s oftencited 1851 opinion in Commonwealth v. Alger, it declared: “‘We think it is a settled
principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of
property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the
implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious . . . to the rights of the
community.’”156
As an abutting owner, the company did have a right of ingress and egress
between Penn Street and its property, but the public also had a right to the
reasonably unhindered use of Penn Street and the sidewalk in front of the market.157
With two competing interests in the use of the street at stake, the court rhetorically
asked: “Who locates the boundary line between the interests of the individual and the
interests of the public?”158 The legislature, in the first instance, by enacting a general
statute; afterward, the judiciary, determining in particular cases whether the statute
was a reasonable exercise of the police power or an arbitrary infringement of
individual rights.159
Turning to the facts of the case before it, the court noted that the company
already had vehicular access to its market and garage from Cherry Street.160 If the
city were attempting to deny all vehicular access to the property “the reasonableness
of its act might justly be questioned,” but as it was, the company sought additional
access that would interfere with motor, street car, and pedestrian traffic on one of the
busiest streets in the city.161 Under those circumstances, the court concluded that
there was no due process violation: the purpose of the ordinances was valid, their
means had a rational relation to the accomplishment of that purpose, and the
interference with the company’s exercise of its property rights was “not arbitrary but
clearly demanded by the public welfare.”162
152

Id. at 401.

153

Id.

154

Id.

155

Id.

156

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 54, 84-85 (1851)).

157

Id. at 401.

158

Id. at 402.

159

Id.

160

Id.

161

Id.

162

Id.
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In its 1938 decision in Breinig v. Allegheny County, by contrast, the Pennsylvania
court was presented with a case in which all vehicular access was denied.163 The
county had issued a curb-cut permit for two driveways between the Breinig property
and the approach to a bridge over the Allegheny River but then, for reasons
unexplained in the opinion, it revoked the permit and closed the driveways.164
Although the bridge approach handled a fair number of vehicles, the local borough
authorities did not believe that the driveways would adversely affect traffic on it.165
So when the property owners sought injunctive relief the trial court granted it,
holding that they “could not be deprived of vehicular access altogether” and ordering
the county to “permit the maintenance of the driveways, subject to reasonable
regulations.”166
On review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court summarized that state’s law on the
right of vehicular access in three propositions. First, a municipality cannot
“completely shut off an abutting owner’s access to his land” without condemnation.
Second, in highly congested areas vehicular access can be reduced to a minimum,
and even “be so limited as to exclude the right to maintain driveways immediately
fronting the property, where it is possible to locate them elsewhere.” Third, no
matter what means of vehicular access is used, “care must be exercised to avoid
danger to the traveling public.”167
As it marked out the location of the boundary line between individual and public
interests, the Breinig court cautioned that an abutting property owner “cannot make a
business of his right of access in derogation of the rights of the traveling public.”168
Instead, the abutter “is entitled to make only such use of his right of access as is
consonant with traffic conditions and police requirements that are reasonable and
uniform.”169
Conversely, the court also warned that: “The absolute prohibition of driveways to
an abutting owner’s land which fronts on a single thoroughfare, and which cannot be
reached by any other means, is unlawful and will not be sustained.”170 Because
traffic conditions on the bridge approach, according to the local borough authorities,
“did not require an absolute prohibition of driveways” to the property, “a complete
bar . . . was too extreme a measure.”171 Instead, the Breinig court believed that the

163

Breinig v. Allegheny Cnty., 2 A.2d 842, 845 (Pa. 1938).

164

Id. The property owners who obtained the driveway permit were a married couple. Id.
at 842-45. They let their property to a chain grocery store under a lease that expressly
provided for the driveways. Id. at 845. These facts suggest that the county may not have
known the driveways were meant for commercial use until after the permit was issued.
165

Id.

166

Id.

167

Id.

168

Id. at 848.

169

Id.

170

Id. at 847-48.

171

Id. at 849.
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county should adopt driveway regulations that would “accord some measure of
access and yet permit public travel with a minimum of danger.”172
As these Pennsylvania decisions illustrate, even in the 1930s courts saw that
some balance had to be achieved between an abutter’s “right of access” and the
“rights of the traveling public.” Soon afterward, as the next part of this Article will
show, an important federal study explored this problem and laid the theoretical
groundwork for its solution. The solution itself, however, would still be decades in
the future.
IV. THE PUBLIC ROADS ADMINISTRATION’S 1947 STUDY OF HIGHWAY ACCESS AND
ROADSIDE DEVELOPMENT AND THE UNDERPINNINGS OF ACCESS MANAGEMENT
By the 1940s the problems posed by unrestricted highway access, and the
accompanying “strip” or “ribbon” type of roadside development, had become
apparent.173
After thirty years of federal support to inter-city highway
construction,174 the nation had developed a system of highways that would “permit
traffic literally to fly between cities only to force it to crawl in spasms when it
reaches the suburbs.”175 The U.S. Public Roads Administration’s 1947 study of this
situation remarked that: “It is perhaps more startling than revealing to attribute a
considerable share of present highway transport inadequacies to a single cause—the
accessibility of a road or street to anybody who chooses to use it in a lawful
manner.”176

172

Id. at 848.

173

As a 1940 law review article noted:

Various studies have shown that the numerous entrances to the highway, the frequent
drawing in and out of the traffic stream, the parking, and the increased pedestrian
traffic, all engendered by commercial use of the roadside, jointly conspire to reduce
substantially the traffic capacity of the highway and to promote congestion, and to
cause a large proportion of the highway accidents.
Robert R. Bowie, Limiting Highway Access, 4 MD. L. REV. 219, 220 (1940).
174
The first federal highway-aid law, enacted in 1916, provided funding to those states that
had highway departments. A subsequent 1921 act created a primary road system, eligible for
federal funding, which would consist of 7% of the rural highways in each state. FED.
HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PUBLICATION NO. FHWA-SA-93-049,
HIGHWAY/UTILITY GUIDE 6 (1993).
175

DAVID R. LEVIN, PUB. ROADS ADMIN., PUBLIC CONTROL
ROADSIDE DEVELOPMENT 3 (1947).

OF

HIGHWAY ACCESS

AND

176
Id. at 4-5. Great Britain responded to this problem with its Restriction of Ribbon
Development Act of 1935. Id. at 2. The British act not only required access permits for main
roads, but also proscribed permits for any building construction (except for farm buildings)
within 220 feet of the centerline of the road unless the highway authority consented to it. Id.
at 90-91. The objective of the act was “to limit the uneconomic, linear expansion of
enterprises and residences and thereby facilitate through traffic, increase highway capacity,
promote safety, preserve the amenities of the countryside, and generally contribute toward
more efficient transportation service.” Id. at 11. As one writer put it:

Every time a bypass was built around a village, it seemed, new ‘ribbon’ or what
Americans call ‘strip’ development would appear along the bypass, and traffic would
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The federal study drew an important distinction between “land service” roads and
“through” highways. As the study noted, “Until the era of the motor vehicle,
practically all highways and streets were utilized largely for access to farms and
homes, factories and business establishments, and recreation facilities.”177 That
access-providing function, the study explained, “is the concept of the ‘land service’
road.”178 But by the 1940s, “with millions of motor vehicles generating billions of
miles of travel on millions of miles of road,” highway authorities had “learned that
some highways must be designed and constructed not as ‘land service’ roads but as
‘through’ highways which will facilitate the movement of large numbers of vehicles
with a minimum of obstruction and a maximum of speed.”179
Failure to properly classify roads by their primary functions, and then to apply
access controls to roads intended to serve as “through” highways, caused a selfdefeating cycle where better roads brought more roadside development, which led to
congestion and slowdowns caused by traffic turning on and off the road. Many of
the nation’s newer highways were of the latest engineering design, yet the study
reported that “compelling evidence indicates that some of these roads will become
functionally obsolescent long before they deteriorate physically.”180
Rapid
functional obsolescence occurred “despite attempts at its correction because of the
absence of effective control of access.”181
In one example, the federal study described how quickly strip development made
California State Route 26 obsolete:
Within about 4 years after the establishment of this fine four-lane
“superhighway” between Los Angeles and Pomona, a distance of
approximately 30 miles, practically a continuous ribbon had developed so
that a 25-mile speed limit had to be imposed for the greater portion of the
route.182
U.S. 1 in Maryland was another example of the strip development problem:
In 1943, between Baltimore and Washington for a distance of 30.5 miles
there were 618 commercial establishments and 665 residences, or one
every 125 feet on the average, each with its own entrances and exits
multiplying the traffic hazards, reducing highway capacity, and
precipitating congestion. . . . This section of US 1 is one of the most
dangerous and congested roads in the country.183
quickly fill the road . . . . [T]he argument . . . that new highways ‘induce’ traffic was
already in use at least as early as the 1920s in Britain.
ROBERT BRUEGMANN, SPRAWL: A COMPACT HISTORY 119-20 (2005).
177

LEVIN, supra note 175, at 5.

178

Id.

179

Id.

180

Id.

181

Id.

182

Id. at 6.

183

Id.
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It should be noted that, at the time of the 1947 federal study, modern limitedaccess highways were in their earliest formative stages. Parkways, intended largely
for recreational purposes and off-limits to commercial traffic, had existed in a
handful of states for perhaps twenty years.184 Because the land along a parkway was
acquired as a public park, access points to the road could be limited by the parkway
authority.185 A few expressways or freeways, open to trucks as well as cars, had also
recently been built, mostly in large urban areas.186 The longest of these, Outer Drive
in Chicago, had a planned length of twenty-five miles.187 When those facilities were
built, any access rights of abutting owners were also acquired.188
The study reported that between 1937 and 1947, only twenty-four states had
enacted legislation allowing the creation of limited-access highways.189 Congress,
however, had signaled that the planned National System of Interstate Highways
would include access restrictions,190 and the study was meant to provide guidance
(and impetus) to the remaining states to enact appropriate enabling legislation.
As it turned out, the highways of the Interstate system were created exclusively
as “through” highways and built to a design standard that allows access at road
interchanges only.191 Access is so closely controlled that even the construction of a
184

Id. at 14, 16, 41. The Bronx River Parkway, in New York, was the first highway
designed for cars. Design work began in 1906, but the parkway was not fully opened for auto
traffic until 1924. Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: The Relation Between Architectural
Modernism, Post-Modernism, Urban Planning, and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
699, 741 (1993).
185

LEVIN, supra note 175, at 16. See, e.g., Burke v. Metro. Dist. Comm’n, 159 N.E. 739,
740 (Mass. 1928) (roadways constructed in a park are not public ways; abutters of the park
have no access rights to the parkway).
186

LEVIN, supra note 175, at 16, 40.

187

Id. at 40. The Willow Run Expressway system, built to serve the B-24 bomber plant
near Ypsilanti, Michigan, joined the Detroit Industrial Expressway, which led to industrial
areas on the southern edge of Detroit. The combined mileage of both systems was about 38
miles. Id. at 40; see also U.S. 12/Ford Exit Dr. South Bend, MICH. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (2012),
http://www.michigan.gov/mdot/0,1607,7-151-9620_11154_11188-28776--,00.html.
Other
expressways built to serve national defense needs included the network around the Pentagon
(12.7 miles) and a freeway from Colorado Springs to Fort Carson, Colorado. LEVIN, supra
note 175, at 40.
188

LEVIN, supra note 175, at 16. These freeways were “the next step in the development of
access control techniques, moving from using landscaped park strips to protect the expressway
(1914) to using the acquisition of private property access rights by recorded deed to restrict
direct access.” PHILIP DEMOSTHENES, ACCESS MANAGEMENT POLICIES: AN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
2
(1999),
available
at
http://www.accessmanagement.info/pdf/
History_of_AM.pdf.
189

LEVIN, supra note 175, at 19-20.

190

Id. at 42.

191

Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, FED.
HIGHWAY
ADMIN.,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
TRANSP.
(Mar.
14,
2012),
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/interstate.cfm. Federal law mandated the acquisition
of access rights for all highways on the Interstate system. DEMOSTHENES, supra note 188, at
3.
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new interchange requires a daunting amount of engineering study and justification.192
Because the Interstates (and similar freeways and expressways) were designed for
mobility only, and not for land access, any access rights of abutting landowners were
permanently acquired (and extinguished) when the highway was built. A
consideration of those roadways, to which access from abutting properties is not
merely regulated but permanently precluded, is outside the scope of this Article. But
the Public Roads Administration’s 1947 study is significant for other reasons.
First, it reflects an important insight into how the function of roads had changed
in the automotive age. In the era of horse-drawn vehicles, there was no evident
conflict between access and mobility: the same road could serve both purposes.193
But the widespread use of automobiles meant that many more vehicles were using
the roadways, and moving at much higher speeds. When those same roadways also
provided access to each parcel of abutting land, no matter how small the parcels and
how short the intervals between driveways, a conflict developed. Traffic volume,
traffic speed, and abundant driveways and intersections did not mix: one of the three
had to go. Since traffic volume was not about to lessen, either traffic speed or the
number of conflicting access points had to be reduced.
Second, the study revealed that even in the 1940s public planners saw that road
building, by itself, could not permanently solve traffic problems. Although wider
pavement and more lanes might improve the situation, roadside development—and
the conflicting cross-currents of vehicles entering and leaving those properties—
would soon reduce the road’s traffic-handling capacity.
Third, the study showed that roads could be classified along a continuum, with
primary highways (mostly for mobility) at one end and land service roads (mostly
for access) at the other.194 Between these poles, there existed an extensive web of
secondary highways and streets allowing traffic to flow between the primary and
land service roads. These secondary roadways, the study indicated, would benefit
from application of access-control devices such as land-use controls and, in rural
areas, restrictions on ribbon development.195
Interestingly, too, the study observed a connection between public investment in
road transportation and the enhancement of private real estate values. Traffic
congestion in cities was a critical problem, but transportation betterments were often
unaffordable because of high land costs—yet those property values would not have
existed but for the network of roads. As the study’s reporting author remarked, “It is
192

Notice of Revised Policy Statement, Access to the Interstate System, 74 Fed. Reg.
43,743 (2009). One item to be considered in an interchange justification study is whether the
functioning of local roads and streets can be improved, by means such as access control, to
accommodate the traffic demand. Id. at 43,744.
193

As the Wisconsin Supreme Court described it,

In early times, local roads were constructed for the improvement of property and in
many instances the land was dedicated for such purpose and the road was paid for by
local real-estate taxes or by special assessments. The concept of access rights in that
context was not greatly influenced by the needs of the public generally which might
clash with an unrestricted use of the property in relation to the abutting street.
Stefan Auto Body v. State Highway Comm’n, 124 N.W.2d 319, 323-24 (Wis. 1963).
194

LEVIN, supra note 175, at 12.

195

Id.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss3/5

30

2012]

ACCESS MANAGEMENT

615

ironic to think that many sorely needed public improvements have been rendered
impossible by the ‘land values’ which the public itself has created.”196
It would take time, however, for these insights to make their way into general
practice. By the late 1940s, many courts had confirmed that state governments could
use their police powers to control access to highways “to achieve public safety and
protect the functional integrity of the highway.”197 Nonetheless, “[w]hile there was a
strong commitment to use [the states’] access control authority for the national
interstate system, the application of access control to the majority of the public
roadway system as an engineering and safety element was for the most part
ignored.”198 Driveway permits did include design and construction standards, and a
permit application might be denied if the proposed location was one where a driver
could not see far enough to safely enter the road, but otherwise “[d]riveways and
intersections were simply built wherever someone wanted one. Connections were
not a roadway design consideration for engineers.”199
Ten years later the effects of this policy—or lack of policy—began to draw some
professional attention. A 1957 study done for the Highway Research Board
196

Id. at 4 n.3.

197

DEMOSTHENES, supra note 188, at 4. In addition to the cases discussed in Part II, supra,
by the late 1940s the high courts of several other states had acknowledged the public’s right to
regulate access. See, e.g., Denman v. City of Tacoma, 268 P. 1043, 1044-45 (Wash. 1928)
(because property had reasonable access to one street, city’s continuing regulatory power over
the use of its streets allowed it to revoke permit for a drive to another street); Kaszer v. City of
Morgantown, 152 S.E. 747, 747 (W. Va. 1930) (reversing writ of mandamus that ordered city
to remove curbing: “Manifestly the protection of life and limb and the safe, free and
convenient use of the public streets by all are matters are matters of public concern and there
is both a power and [an] obligation on the part of the public authorities to pass and enforce
reasonable police provisions for this purpose.”) (internal citation omitted); Jones Beach
Boulevard Estate, Inc. v. Moses, 197 N.E. 313, 315 (N.Y. 1935) (“The [access] rights of an
abutter are subject to the right of the State to regulate and control the public highways for the
benefit of the traveling public.”); McGowan v. City of Burns, 137 P.2d 994, 999 (Or. 1943)
(“The right of access to and egress from a public street is subject to the public’s superior rights
and to public regulation.”); Alexander Co. v. City of Owatonna, 24 N.W.2d 244, 248, 251-52
(Minn. 1946) (city council could deny curb cut where evidence at council hearing showed it
would be a traffic hazard: “[M]unicipalities possess extensive and drastic police powers with
respect to the care, supervision, and control of streets.”). Even decisions that did not uphold
particular regulations still agreed that the government could regulate access. See, e.g., R.G.
Lydy, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 190 N.E. 273, 277 (Ill. 1934) (“The city council may exercise a
reasonable supervision over the construction and maintenance of driveway across sidewalks”
but the ordinance in question was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.); City of
Norman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 145 P.2d 765, 765-67 (Okla. 1944) (trial court did not err in
issuing injunction to allow driveway; evidence that driveway was a traffic hazard was
conflicting: “No case is cited, and we have found none, holding that an abutting owner may be
entirely deprived of his right of ingress and egress to the street under reasonable
regulations.”); Newman v. Mayor of Newport, 57 A.2d 173, 179-80 (R.I. 1948) (city had the
power to regulate driveways for traffic safety, and properly authorized the commissioner of
public works to rule on curb cut applications “so that conflicting public and private rights
might be fairly adjusted by governmental control and regulation,” but commissioner’s
decision was not reasonable because it effectively barred any commercial use of the property).
198

DEMOSTHENES, supra note 188, at 4.

199

Id.
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concluded that there was a direct relationship between the number of access points
and the number of accidents on highways with similar traffic levels.200 The study’s
author also concluded that the number of accidents increased as drivers were
presented with more situations requiring a decision, such as the presence of a turning
vehicle.201 This was “one of the earliest conclusions that driver workload, caused in
part by the frequency of access-related turning movements, is a strong contributing
factor in accident potential on busy highways.”202
Soon afterward, in 1960, the American Association of State Highway Officials
published a document providing guidance on how to create appropriate regulations
for driveways along major highways.203 In addition to providing design criteria, the
guide recommended use of access controls to lessen interference with traffic flow:
“Most of the interference originates in vehicle movements to and from
businesses, residences or other development along the highways.
Accordingly, regulations and overall control of driveway connections are
necessary to provide efficient and safe operations, and to utilize the full
potential of the highway investment. It is proper that some control be
exercised over the number, location, and general design features of
driveways between the highway and adjacent private property.”204
A decade later, in 1971, the National Cooperative Highway Research Program
(NCHRP) issued a report on its study of the relationship between transportation and
land use in which it concluded:
“The lack of access control along arterial highways has been the largest
single factor contributing to the obsolescence of highway facilities.
Inadequate access control has resulted in the functional obsolescence of
an entire generation of new arterial facilities built only a short while
ago.”205
The report also noted that access controls were most critically needed in urban
areas, “where land development intensity, congestion, and accident potential are
greatest.”206 Even so, few cities had even tried to control access to their arterial
200

Id. at 5 (citing DAVID SCHOPPERT, PREDICTING TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS FROM ROADWAY
ELEMENTS OF RURAL TWO-LANE HIGHWAYS WITH GRAVEL SHOULDERS, HIGHWAY RESEARCH
BULLETIN NO. 158 (1957)).
201

Id.

202

Id.

203

Id. (citing AMERICAN ASS’N OF STATE HIGHWAY OFFICIALS, AN INFORMATIONAL GUIDE
FOR PREPARING PRIVATE DRIVEWAY REGULATIONS FOR MAJOR HIGHWAYS (1960) [hereinafter
INFORMATIONAL GUIDE]).
204
DEMOSTHENES, supra note 188, at 5 (quoting INFORMATIONAL GUIDE, supra note 203).
The AASHO guide’s recommendations were no novel enlargement of governmental power:
the 1910 Goodfellow Tire decision agreed that a state could delegate to a commissioner
authority to issue driveway permits “subject to reasonable regulations and conditions as to
number, location, plan of construction, and material used therein.” Goodfellow Tire Co. v.
Comm’r of Parks and Boulevards of Detroit, 128 N.W. 410, 413 (Mich. 1910).
205

DEMOSTHENES, supra note 188, at 5 (quoting NCHRP, supra note 8, at 46).

206

NAT’L COOP. HIGHWAY RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 8, at 48.
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streets: “These uncontrolled access facilities are subject to the same deteriorating
influences that have caused the obsolescence of most of the arterial facilities
constructed in the last 50 years.”207
Indeed, the NCHRP report’s conclusion—that proliferating access points
damaged the traffic-handling capabilities of highways intended for large volumes of
fast-moving vehicles—mirrored the Public Roads Administration’s study from a
generation earlier. Nonetheless, it was not until 1979 that Colorado became the first
state to legislate a comprehensive program for managing access to all state
highways.208 The following section of this Article describes the Colorado program,
along with those of Florida and New Jersey, and delineates the important principles
that they (and other states’ access management programs) have in common.
V. MODERN ACCESS MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS: SOME BRIEF SKETCHES
A. Colorado
Colorado’s pioneering state-wide access management law took four important
steps:
First, to maintain smooth traffic flow on state highways and protect their
functional level, the Colorado legislature made each state highway a “controlledaccess highway” to which abutting property owners had a right of access only where
permitted, under the state highway access code, by the public authority having
jurisdiction over it.209
Second, the legislature stated that owners of lands abutting state highways had a
right of “reasonable access to the general street system” but no right of direct access
to the state highway itself.210
Third, it directed the state transportation commission to base the access code’s
rules on considerations such as highway traffic volume, the functional classification
of the highway, local land use plans and zoning, the type and volume of traffic that
would be using the driveway for which a permit is sought, and the availability of
vehicular access from local streets rather than a state highway.211
Fourth, the legislature allowed existing driveways to remain, but specified that
their owners might have to relocate or reconstruct them to conform to the access
code if “a change in the use of the property . . . results in a change in the type of

207

Id.

208

DEMOSTHENES, supra note 188, at 6.

209

COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 43-2-147(1)(a), 42-1-102(18) (2010).

210

COLO. REV. STAT. § 43-2-147(1)(b)-(c) (2010). The only abutting uses having a right of
direct access to state highways are police, fire, ambulance, and other emergency stations. Id.
To make sure that local land development decisions were consistent with the new law, the
legislature also required connections to the state highway system, as laid out in new
subdivision plats, to comply with the access code. COLO. REV. STAT. § 43-2-147(1)(b) (2010).
211

COLO. REV. STAT. § 43-2-147(4) (2010).
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driveway operation.”212 Whether relocation or reconstruction is necessary would “be
determined by reference to the standards set forth in the access code.”213
The central element of the access code’s regulatory framework in Colorado, as in
other states, is the categorization of each highway (or segment of a highway) based
on its function, current and projected. How a given roadway will be categorized
depends on factors such as the speed and volume of traffic and how far it is
traveling—regionally, between cities, or within the local area. As those factors
increase, the allowable number of intersecting driveways will decrease, and the
design requirements for the ones that are allowed will become more demanding.
The category decision is made by the Colorado Department of Transportation in
consultation with local governments and planning organizations, and if those parties
cannot reach a consensus, the matter is decided by the state Transportation
Commission in a rule-making hearing.214
A road intended for local traffic, for example, might be categorized as a frontage
road where “[a]ccess needs . . . take priority over through traffic movements” and
each parcel of land is normally granted at least one full-movement, unsignalized
driveway.215 By contrast, a road intended for high traffic volumes over relatively
long distances might be classed as a principal highway, on which “[d]irect access
service to abutting land is subordinate to providing service to through traffic
movements.”216 Direct access to one of these highways is allowed only if there is no
reasonable access by the local street system. Any driveway that is allowed may have
to serve multiple properties, probably will not have left-turn access unless the
location is appropriate for a traffic signal,217 and will need to have a right turn
deceleration lane if the projected peak volume of traffic using the driveway is greater
than 25 vehicles per hour.218
Driveway traffic volume is also pivotal. No matter what functional category the
highway has, if a driveway is expected to handle 100 vehicles per hour or more,219 a
212

COLO. REV. STAT. § 43-2-147(6)(a)-(b) (2010). If changes in road or traffic conditions,
rather than a change in the use of the property, spurred the need to relocate or reconstruct an
existing drive, the work would be done at the Department of Transportation’s expense.
213

COLO. REV. STAT. § 43-2-147(6)(b) (2010).

214

2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 601-2.2 (LexisNexis 2010).

215

2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 601-3.13 (LexisNexis 2010). “Full movement” means that right
and left turns can be made into and out of the driveway.
216

2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 601-3.10 (LexisNexis 2010).

217

Id. In Magness v. State of Colorado, the court upheld the highway department’s
decision (under an earlier version of the code) to permit a driveway that allowed only rightturn access because the applicant did not prove his application qualified for full-movement
access under the criteria set forth in the code. Magness v. State, 844 P.2d 1304, 1307-08
(Colo. App. 1992).
218
2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 601-3.10 (LexisNexis 2010). Traffic signals are allowed only if
there is good signal progression—that is, if the signals can be “timed” to allow efficient
movement of through traffic. Id.
219

The code refers to a design hourly volume (DHV) of 100 vehicles or more. 2 COLO.
CODE REGS. § 601-2.3(5) (LexisNexis 2010). DHV is “an hourly traffic volume determined
for use in the geometric design of highways. It is the 30th highest hour vehicular volume
experienced in a one year period.” 2 COLO. CODE REGS. 601-1.5 (2010).
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permit applicant must conduct a traffic impact study. The study must include
analysis of projected traffic volumes for the development site and the study area;
reasonable access alternatives (including one with no direct highway access);
projected turn lane queue lengths; proximity of other access points; the ability of the
roadway system to handle increased traffic; and the ability to synchronize any
proposed turn signal with other signals in the area.220 For existing “grandfathered”
driveways, 100 vehicles per day is a relevant threshold: a change in use that
increases volume above that level, or increases traffic volume to the site by twenty
percent or more, may trigger application of the code’s requirements.221
The Colorado access code also specifies many driveway location standards.
Notably, the standard for access spacing requires driveways to be separated by a
distance equal to or greater than the design sight distance applicable to the highway
in question.222 On a typical arterial highway with a posted speed limit of fifty miles
per hour, the design sight distance standard would require at least 475 feet between
driveways.223
B. Florida
Florida’s “State Highway System Access Management Act” took effect in July,
1988.224 The Florida legislature prefaced its Act with several findings. First, that it
was necessary to regulate access to the state highway system to protect the public
safety and welfare, promote the efficient movement of people and goods, and
“preserve the functional integrity of the State Highway System.”225 Second, that an
access management program would help coordinate the land use planning decisions
of local governments with the investments made in the state highway system, and
that “unregulated access to the State Highway System is one of the contributing
factors to the congestion and functional deterioration of the system.”226 Third, that
an access management program would benefit the public by increasing the trafficcarrying capacity of the state highway system, reducing accidents and highway

220

2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 601-2.3(5) (LexisNexis 2010).

221

2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 601-2.6(3) (LexisNexis 2010).

222

2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 601-4.4 (LexisNexis 2010). This required spacing ensures that a
driver in the right lane of the road, coming up on a driveway with a vehicle in it, will have an
unobstructed view that is far enough to react to a vehicle entering the road at the next
driveway. The design sight distance standard is related to stopping sight distance, which is
“distance required by a driver of a vehicle, traveling at a given speed, to bring the vehicle to a
stop after an object on the roadway becomes visible. It includes the distance traveled during
driver perception and reaction times and the vehicle braking distance.” 2 COLO. CODE REGS.
601-1.5(78) (2010). Adequate design sight distance means that the driver has enough space
(and time) to see, react to, and stop for another vehicle.
223

2 COLO. CODE REGS. 601-1-4.3(1)-(2) (2010).

224

Kunnen v. Dep’t of Transp., No. 01-0009, 2001 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 3051, at
*5 (Dec. 14, 2001).
225

FLA. STAT. § 335.181(1)(a) (2010).

226

FLA. STAT. § 335.181(1)(b) (2010).
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maintenance costs, promoting economic growth, and lengthening the effective life of
the state’s transportation facilities.227
Accordingly, the legislature directed the Florida Department of Transportation
(FDOT) to develop an access control classification system for all routes on the state
highway system, with a coordinated set of access management standards to be used
in planning access to state highways and evaluating permit applications.228 Florida’s
highways would be classified based on their function, traffic volume, and other
factors, with the Department making a final decision after notice, public meetings,
and coordination with local government entities.229 The access management
standards, according to the legislature’s direction, would set criteria for the spacing,
location, design, and construction of connections to the state highway system, for
safety factors, for the use of traffic control devices, and similar matters.230
The act also empowered FDOT to regulate all vehicular access and connections
to the state highway system through a new permitting procedure it was ordered to
adopt.231 Driveways not covered by earlier permit laws would be allowed to remain
in service, but a permit would be required if there was a significant change in use,
design, or traffic flow of the connection.232 Previously permitted driveways also
could remain, subject to permit modification or revocation (after notice and a
hearing) if a “significant change” occurred.233 This meant that whenever additional
traffic was projected due to an expansion or redevelopment, the permit holder must
ask FDOT to determine if a new permit application would be required.234
Florida’s highway classification system, like Colorado’s, depends in part on how
much a given roadway is used by through traffic.235 Florida’s system also depends
on the amount of development in the area served by the roadway: the most restrictive
access categories are for highways in “areas without existing extensive
development,” while the least restrictive categories relate to places with “moderate
to extensive development.”236 On a typical arterial highway with a posted speed
limit of fifty miles per hour, connections such as driveways and streets must be
spaced at least 440 feet apart, while median openings and traffic signals must be a
227

See FLA. STAT. § 335.181(1)(c) (2010).

228

FLA. STAT. § 335.188(1)-(2) (2010).

229

See FLA. STAT. § 335.188(3) (2010); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 14-97.004 (2010).

230

See FLA. STAT. § 335.188(3) (2010).

231

See FLA. STAT. §§ 335.182-.1825 (2010).

232

FLA. STAT. § 335.187(1) (2010); FLA. STAT. § 335.182(3)(b) (2010) (defining
“Significant change” as “a change in the use of the property, including land, structures or
facilities, or an expansion of the size of the structures or facilities causing an increase in the
trip generation of the property exceeding 25 percent more trip generation (either peak hour or
daily) and exceeding 100 vehicles per day more than the existing use.”); FLA. STAT. §
335.182(3)(a) (2010) (defining “Connection” as “driveways, streets, turnouts, or other means
of providing for the right of reasonable access to or from the State Highway System.”).
233

See FLA. STAT. § 335.187(2) (2010).

234

See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 14-97.005(2) (2010).

235

See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 14-97.003(2)(b) (2010).

236

Id.
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half-mile apart.237 For the least restricted roadways, “where there is little intent or
opportunity to provide high speed travel,” connections may be as close together as
125 feet, and signals may be a quarter-mile apart.238
As in Colorado, the complexity of the permit application process depends on the
number of daily vehicle trips expected at the site. If that number exceeds 601, the
application must include estimated trip generation data, a site plan, information
about the abutting roads and nearby connections, location and design information for
each connection to be permitted, and a detailed traffic study.239
In addition to its findings, the Florida legislature made a policy declaration: that a
property owner “has a right to reasonable access to the abutting state highway but
does not have the right of unregulated access to such highway.”240 “Reasonable
access” was left undefined, but the legislature signaled that it does not have to be
direct access,241 especially if a service road is built.242 The Florida Administrative
Code later defined “reasonable access” as “the minimum number of connections,
direct or indirect, necessary to provide safe and efficient ingress and egress to the
State Highway System based on [the access management act], the Access
Management Classification, projected connection and roadway traffic volumes, and
the type and intensity of the land use.”243
237

FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 14-97.003(1) (2010) (using an Access Class 5 roadway as an
example).
238
Id.; FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 14-97.003(2)(b)(6) (2010) (referring to an Access Class
7 roadway).
239

FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 14-96.005(4) (2010); see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 1496.002(35) (2010) (Here a “trip” is defined as a one way vehicle movement, so each time a
customer visits an establishment in a car, there are two trips: one in and one out. A business
that is open twelve hours and serves twenty-five customers per hour would generate 600 trips
(300 in and 300 out)).
240

FLA. STAT. § 335.181(2)(a) (2010).

241

See FLA. STAT. § 335.181(6) (2010) (“The denial of reasonable direct access to an
abutting state highway [in the administrative permitting process] is not compensable under the
provisions of this act unless the denial would be otherwise compensable absent the provisions
of this act.”).
242
See FLA. STAT. § 335.181(7) (2010) (encouraging construction of service roads that
provide reasonable access to state highways: “[N]othing in this act requires that a property
owner whose land abuts a service road be given direct access across the service road to the
state highway.”).
243
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 14-97.002(25) (2010) (emphasis added); see also Racetrac
Petroleum, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., No. 94-6741RP, 1995 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 4874,
at *18-19 (Apr. 27, 1995) (stating that gas station and restaurant owners challenged the rule’s
equivalent treatment of direct and indirect access and argued that FDOT lacked authority “to
consider either alternate or joint access as reasonable access”); id. at *19-20 (explaining the
hearing officer’s disagreement, and holding that indirect access could be reasonable: “No firm
and fast formula for determining the reasonableness of access has been devised. Direct access
is easy to determine. It is a connection which joins the highway directly. However, there are
other means of providing access. These may include access gained by connection to a side
street which directly connects with the highway, or the use of a joint easement or a service
road and are called indirect access. In determining whether indirect access can constitute
reasonable access, many factors . . . must be considered.”).
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One form of access connection is the shared or joint-use driveway. Florida’s
legislature has encouraged property owners to “implement the use of joint access
where legally available”244 and the state’s courts have upheld FDOT’s power to
require a joint-use driveway as a condition of permit approval.245 The legislature has
also encouraged the use of service roads to provide reasonable access to state
highways.246 So long as a service road provides access suitable to the property’s
type of development, Florida courts have found it to be a legally sufficient substitute
for direct access to an abutting state highway.247
C. New Jersey
New Jersey’s 1989 State Highway Access Management Act, like its Florida
counterpart, begins with several important legislative findings and declarations.
First, the purpose of the state highway system is to serve as a network of principal
arterial routes, and it is an irreplaceable public asset that was built at great public
expense. Second, land development and unrestricted access to state highways can
impair this purpose and damage the public investment in the highway system. Third,
every owner of property abutting a public road has “a right of reasonable access to
the general system of streets and highways” but not to a particular means of access;
and while government regulation may not eliminate all access to the general street
system without providing just compensation, access to a state highway is subordinate
to the public’s right and interest in a safe and efficient highway. Fourth, access
management regulations are needed to protect the functional integrity of the state
highway system and the public investment in the system.248
Like Colorado’s and Florida’s programs, New Jersey’s access management code
is based on a classification of highways by function, with attention to “the
244

FLA. STAT. § 335.181(2)(b) (2010).

245

See Paradyne Corp. v. State, 528 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding
that FDOT could require Paradyne’s drive connection to an arterial road to provide access to a
neighboring property as well); see also id. at 926-27 (stating that FDOT could not make
Paradyne build a joint-use driveway on its own private property, but it could make the shared
driveway a condition precedent to an access permit, since the evidence showed that separate
driveways would be unsafe and impractical; and adding that if Paradyne would not accept
that condition, then FDOT could deny access to the arterial road, and Paradyne (and the
neighboring property) would be relegated to use of the “alternate available accesses to their
properties”).
246

FLA. STAT. § 335.181(7) (2010).

247

Where Florida courts draw the line on this issue is somewhat unclear. It seems safe to
say that if a commercial property loses its only direct access to an abutting main road, and the
substitute access is through residential streets, a substantial loss of access (and a taking of a
property right) occurs. See Palm Beach Cnty. v. Tessler, 538 So. 2d 846, 847-50 (Fla. 1989).
But service road access can adequately replace direct highway access if the new travel path to
and from the property seems reasonable to the court. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Fisher, 958 So.
2d 586, 590-93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that the service road did not cause a
“substantial loss of access”); accord Kunnen v. Dep’t of Transp., No. 01-0009, 2001 Fla. Div.
Adm. Hear. LEXIS 3051, at *21-23, 33-34 (Dec. 14, 2001) (explaining that the service road
did not cause a substantial loss of access where the new travel path involved two service
roads).
248

See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-90 (West 2010).
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appropriate and desirable balance between facilitating safe and convenient
movement of through traffic and providing direct access to abutting property.”249
For each classification, the code contains standards for geometric design and
minimum and desirable spacing criteria for driveways and intersections.250 New
subdivisions of land abutting state highways must comply with the access code;251
existing permitted driveways are allowed to remain in place, but if an expansion or
change in use will result in a significant increase in traffic (an additional ten percent
of daily traffic or one hundred movements during the peak hour, whichever is
greater), a new permit and compliance with the access code are required.252
Access management rules are most readily applied to new development. As an
older and more densely populated state, however, New Jersey faced a greater
problem in “retrofitting” its regulations to existing development. The legislature
addressed this problem in three novel ways.
First, it declared that areas with “extensive commercial activity oriented toward
and dependent upon a State highway should not be classified by reason of that level
of activity as urban environments for access management purposes.”253 Instead, if an
area of highway-oriented business was “characterized by excessive driveway
openings, excessive traffic congestion, excessive accident rates, or undesirably low
average rates of speed” then New Jersey Department of Transportation (NJDOT)
should manage the highway within that area “to mitigate these nuisances.”254
Second, the legislature authorized the commissioner of transportation to issue
nonconforming-lot access permits that would include limits on the maximum
vehicular use of any driveway built or operated under the permit.255 The act also
called for the adoption of “alternative design standards for each highway
classification which, combined with limits on vehicular use, can be applied to lots
which were in existence prior to the adoption of the access code” and cannot meet
the code’s standards.256
Third, it empowered the commissioner to revoke an access permit (after notice
and a hearing) if “alternative access” is available and the revocation would be

249
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-91(b) (West 2010); see generally N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 27:791(a)-(i) (West 2010) (stating that the access code and classifications were developed after
public hearings, with the input of members of the legislature, and under the guidance of an
advisory committee appointed by the governor that included members recommended by the
legislature, a traffic engineer, two developers, and representatives of business and industry).
250

See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-91(c) (West 2010).

251

See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-96 (West 2010).

252

N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 27:7-92(d), 7-95 (West 2010).

253

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-90(i) (West 2010).

254

Id.

255

See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-93 (West 2010) (ensuring that, if a driveway cannot be
located to meet the access code’s requirements because the lot it is too narrow or located too
close to an intersection, the parcel will not be landlocked); Jerome G. Rose, Regulating the
Use of Land Abutting State Highways: New Jersey’s State Highway Access Management Act,
18 REAL EST. L.J. 288, 292 (1990) (discussing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-93 (West 1990)).
256

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-91(c) (West 2010).
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consistent with the purposes of the access management act.257 For properties zoned
or used for residential or agricultural purposes, a connection to any improved public
street or highway that provides reasonable access to the general system of streets and
highways is deemed “alternative access.”258 If the property is zoned or used for
industrial purposes, a connection to an access road is sufficient, but it must be “of
sufficient design to support necessary truck and employee access as required by the
industry.”259 Properties zoned or used for commercial purposes may connect to “any
parallel or perpendicular street, highway, easement, service road or common
driveway” provided the roadway’s design is sufficient to support commercial traffic
and will give motorists “a convenient, direct, and well-marked means of both
reaching the business or use and returning to the highway.”260
The alternative access must be open for use before the commissioner can revoke
a permit.261 In addition, the state must pay for engineering costs; construction work
associated with the change such as installing new access drives and removing old
ones, improving on-site circulation to accommodate the new drive locations, and
replacing signs; and obtaining any needed land or property rights.262 Finally, the act
authorized the commissioner, and county and municipal governments, to “build new
roads or acquire access easements to provide alternative access to existing developed
lots which have no other means of access except to a State highway.”263
New Jersey’s courts have sustained these provisions of the act, but have reached
somewhat different results about how to decide whether “alternative access” is
acceptable under the statutory standards. If no land is taken from the abutting
owner, the decision is made and reviewed administratively, and any judicial review
is made with deference to the administrative findings and decisions.264 In that setting
the appeals court actually used heightened deference, reasoning that application of
the access management code required highly technical knowledge within the area of
expertise that the legislature had specifically assigned to NJDOT.265 When land is
taken from the abutter, however, exhaustion of administrative remedies has not been

257
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-94(a) (West 2010); see also In re I/M/O Route 206 at Lot 13B
New Amwell, 731 A.2d 56, 61 (N.J. 1999) (Closing one driveway onto a state highway, when
another point of direct access to the highway remains open, is considered to be a
“modification” of access and not the revocation of an access permit.).
258

See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-94(c)(3) (West 2010).

259

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-94(c)(2) (West 2010).

260

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-94(c)(1) (West 2010) (including wholesale, retail, service, and
office uses in the commercial category, along with residential developments “in excess of four
residential units per acre with a total acreage of 25 or more acres”).
261

See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-94(d) (West 2010).

262

Id.

263

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-97 (West 2010).

264

See In the Matter of the Revocation of the Access of Block No. 1901, Lot No. 1,
Borough of Paramus, Bergen Cnty. Parkway 17 Assoc.,735 A.2d 594, 597, 601 (N.J. 1999)
[hereinafter Parkway 17].
265

Id. at 601-02.
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required: the jury in the eminent domain case, as fact-finder, may decide whether the
alternative access is reasonable.266
D. An Overview of Typical Access Management Principles
State and local governments continue to adopt access management programs.
Some are based on new enabling legislation like Virginia’s 2007 access management
act;267 others, like Indiana’s 2009 Access Management Guide, are administrative
rules or policies issued under the state transportation department’s existing authority
to regulate and control state highways.268 Certain key principles, however, are held
in common.
The first is classification of roadways by their intended function. The
categorization is made using measurable criteria such as traffic volume, speed limits,
and the relative amounts of through and local traffic; along with reference to the
built environment as shown by type and density of nearby development, number of
lanes in the road, and the presence or absence of median dividers. This classification
function is somewhat like the establishment of zoning districts for the regulation of
land use, but with one major difference: in access management, the regulations apply
to the use of a public asset rather than private property.
The second key principle is tailoring access management regulations to fit the
roadway classifications. If a given roadway is largely meant for low-speed local
travel, interruption of traffic flow at driveways and intersections and traffic signals is
expected and consistent with the road’s intended purpose. Conversely, if the
roadway’s main function is to carry large volumes of traffic over longer distances,
such interruptions interfere with the purpose of the road and should be minimized.
Safety concerns will also dictate wider driveway and street intersection spacing on
high-speed, high-volume roads, particularly in urban settings where a driver’s
attention is subject to more distracting influences.269
266
Compare Magliochetti v. State, 647 A.2d 1386, 1393-95 (N.J. 1995) (deciding not to
send the issue to an administrative law judge since the factual record about the access point’s
location and functionality was undisputed and court involvement (in the eminent domain
action) would be needed anyway), with Parkway 17, 735 A.2d at 601-02 (N.J. 1999) (differing
on one key point: Magliochetti held that a jury could decide whether the alternative access
was reasonable while Parkway 17 treated the matter as one that required specialized agency
expertise).
267

See generally VA. CODE § 33.1-198.1 (2010).

268

See generally AECOM TRANSP., IND. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ACCESS MANAGEMENT GUIDE
(Aug. 2006, revised Sept. 2009), available at http://in.gov/indot/files/guide_total.pdf; see also
IND. CODE §9-21-19-2 (2012) (providing the legal authority for access permitting: “The
Indiana department of transportation shall adopt rules and requirements for private entrances,
driveways, and approaches necessary to provide for drainage of the highway, preservation of
the highway, and the safety and convenience of traffic on the highway.”).
269

See TRANSP. RESEARCH INST. AT OR. ST. UNIV. & OR. DEP’T OF TRANSP., STOPPING
SIGHT DISTANCE AND DECISION SIGHT DISTANCE (Feb. 1997), available at
http://www.oregon.gov/ ODOT /HWY/ACCESSMGT/docs/StopDist.pdf?ga=t (explaining
that traffic engineers have determined that, in addition to the time (and space) that it takes to
stop a vehicle once the brakes are applied, it also takes time (and space) for the driver to
discern an object or event in the road, understand its implications, decide how to react, and
then initiate the action (such as applying the brakes)); see also id. at 24 (describing that the
perception-reaction process takes longer on high-speed, high-volume roadways, such as
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Third, how the regulations are applied through the permitting process depends
not only on the classification of the roadway but also on the amount of traffic
expected to use the driveway. A high-volume driveway might require a right-turn
lane or even a stop light, introducing another variable because its proposed location
must meet traffic signal progression requirements. On the other hand, a permit for a
low-volume driveway might allow movements (such as left turns in and out) that
would not be acceptable for a higher-volume use.
Fourth, existing driveways that do not meet the new regulations normally are
allowed to remain in service, but their use cannot be significantly expanded. So, for
example, the driveways serving a small 1960s-era sit-down restaurant might be
“grandfathered,” but if the owner plans to tear it down and replace it with a fast-food
restaurant—or to assemble the parcel with others to create a site for a big-box
retailer—the prospective change in driveway traffic volume would trigger
application of all the access management code’s permitting requirements. Such
provisions are analogous to “legal non-conforming use” status under a zoning code,
blunting the impact of the access regulations on improvements that were lawful
when built but not allowing the non-conformity to be expanded.
Having considered how (and why) governments exercise their police powers to
regulate access to roadways, we will next consider what rights property owners have
to gain access to public roads. As the next part of this Article will show, “access”
encompasses a number of concepts, and not all of them are entitled to the same
degree of legal protection. And having a clear understanding of the kind of “access”
at issue is critical when courts are called on to determine whether a property right
has been taken.
VI. A SUMMARY OF THE CURRENT LAW OF ACCESS
A. Access to Traffic and Accessibility within the Network of Roads
Changes to the network of public roadways can have a great impact on the use
and value of private property. When a new interchange is built on a major highway,
for example, land situated at the interchange will gain development potential for a
highway-oriented use such as a fast-food restaurant or gas station or motel. Larger
sites, further from the interchange but benefiting by its proximity, may become more
attractive for industrial or commercial development. The land now has access to
something: to traffic volume, to a road that offers rapid long-distance mobility, that
it did not have before. Variations in these elements can have a significant influence
on property use and property value. Yet none of them have anything to do with
access to land—with the ability to go back and forth between land and an abutting
public road—which is the interest upon which the law of access is based.
These multiple meanings can lead to confusion when access is at issue in a
lawsuit. When the Florida Department of Transportation closed the entrance and
exit ramps at McCoy’s Creek Boulevard and Interstate 95 in Jacksonville, for
example, the nearby area’s connectivity to the road network changed radically, as
did its access to traffic on the Interstate. An affected landowner, L.I. Gefen, sued in
inverse condemnation, presenting expert testimony that the ramp closure
arterial streets and highways in urban areas, due to the complex conditions and driver
expectations of an uninterrupted traffic flow); id. at 23, 25 (concluding that while the design
standard for stopping sight distance on a road with a design speed of fifty miles per hour is
461 feet, the decision sight distance for the same road in an urban area would be 975 feet).
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substantially impacted access to and from her property and destroyed it as a business
site.270 The trial and appeals courts agreed that a taking had occurred: in their view
the evidence showed that “the closing of the ramp effectively denied suitable access”
to the commercial property, which could “only be reached by an ‘indirect, winding
route through several blocks of residential neighborhood.’”271
But the Florida Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts, pointing out that
access from the Gefen property to the roads that actually abutted it was
undiminished.272 What had changed was the way those roads connected to I-95. Yet
as the Florida court explained, the owner had no “compensable vested right to that
access.”273 Nor did she have a right to high-volume vehicle traffic: “Access, as a
property interest, does not include a right to traffic flow even though commercial
property might very well suffer adverse economic effects as a result of reduced
traffic.”274
As the Florida court’s Gefen opinion illustrates, the law of access distinguishes
between vehicle movements to and from an abutting road and movements within the
road network. And these differ yet again from access to traffic volume. These
differences—between access to land, accessibility within the overall system of roads,
and access to traffic—have led to some generally accepted (but not often wellexplained) rules of law, as the following discussion will show.
1. Access to Traffic
Traffic volume is the best-defined of all the “access” issues. There is nearly
universal agreement that no one has a property right in the volume of traffic using a
road.275

270

Dep’t of Transp. v. Gefen, 620 So. 2d 1087, 1087 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).

271

Id. at 1088.

272

Dep’t of Transp. v. Gefen, 636 So. 2d 1345, 1346 (Fla. 1994).

273

Id.

274

Id.; see also Leonard v. People ex rel. Dep’t of Transp., 62 Cal. App. 4th 1296, 1299
(Ct. App. 1998) (“Such compensation must rest upon the property owner’s showing of a
substantial impairment of his right of access to the general system of public streets.”).
275
See, e.g., Grove & Burke, Inc. v. City of Fort Dodge, 469 N.W.2d 703, 705 (Iowa 1991)
(“We have long held that landowners have no vested right to the continuance of existing
traffic past their establishments.”) (quoting Iowa State Highway Comm’n v. Smith, 82
N.W.2d 775, 762 (1957)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Gibson v. Comm’r of Highways,
178 N.W.2d 727, 730 (Minn. 1970) (“A property owner has no vested interest in the continued
flow of the main stream of through traffic.”); Barnes v. N.C. State Highway Comm’n., 126
S.E.2d 732, 738 (N.C. 1962) (“An individual proprietor has no right to insist that the entire
volume of traffic that would naturally flow over a highway of which he owns the fee pass
undiverted and unobstructed. In fact, while under some circumstances and conditions he has a
right of access to and from his own premises, he has no constitutional right to have anyone
pass by his premises at all.”); State ex rel. Merritt v. Linzell, 126 N.E.2d 53, 56-57 (Ohio
1955) (“It is now an established doctrine in most jurisdictions that such an owner has no right
to the continuation or maintenance of the flow of traffic past his property. The diminution in
the value of land occasioned by a public improvement that diverts the main flow of traffic
from in front of one's premises is noncompensable.”); 2A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.02(8)(d) (rev. 3d ed., 1997) (“The temporary or permanent diversion of
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When the State of New York rerouted part of a highway leading to a popular
recreational area in the Catskills, for example, it diverted traffic away from a
restaurant and motel that previously enjoyed a “strategic” location.276 But the
landowners had no right to any compensation for losing access to the tourist traffic
that formerly passed in front of their business:
A property owner so situated has no right to be located directly on a State
highway nor does he have a right to have traffic pass in front of his
property. True, the presence of those factors may increase the value of
the property, but any such increase is purely fortuitous in the sense that it
does not result from any expenditure of effort or funds on the part of the
property owner.277
Instead, the advantage enjoyed by the motel was essentially an opportunistic one,
like that of a diner next to an office building or a bar across the street from a
stadium. No one has a property right in the office workers on their lunch break or
the fans after a football game; likewise, no one has a property right in the tourist
traffic on a road:
It is as if the State . . . shut down the recreational center which attracted so
many persons to the area . . . . Surely no one would argue that the State
would be liable to the claimants for consequential damages resulting from
such closing. While the recreation center is in operation the claimants
benefit because their property happens to be located in the same general
area. If the recreation center were closed, they would have no legal right
to complain.278
Given the clear consensus against compensating property owners when loss of
traffic volume results in loss of property value, affected landowners commonly
frame such claims as a generic “access” problem. But any confusion can be sorted
out by considering what would happen if the road did not change but the traffic
disappeared: the extent to which a property’s utility and value decrease under that
scenario is the extent to which those factors depend on traffic volume, not access.279
traffic as a result of highway construction does not effect a compensable taking so long as
reasonable access is provided to an impacted property.”).
276

Bopp v. State, 227 N.E.2d 37, 38 (N.Y. 1967).

277

Id. at 39.

278

Id. at 39-40.

279

See La Briola v. State, 328 N.E.2d 781, 785 (N.Y. 1975); see also Kan. City v.
Berkshire Lumber Co., 393 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Mo. 1965) (rejecting business’s claim for
damages due to loss of “view” from the highway: “Any claim on this basis is inextricably
related to a property right in the traffic upon Truman Road. Cases of this state have
consistently refused to accord to property owners any right in the continuation of traffic upon
an established highway.”). It appears that two states, Alabama and Oklahoma, while not
recognizing claims based solely on diversion of traffic, will allow evidence of lost traffic
volume when assessing damages in partial-takings cases. These decisions rest on the fact that
traffic influences value; they err by allowing compensation to be awarded for the loss of
traffic volume even though access to traffic is not a property right. Compare State v. Moore,
382 So.2d 543, 545 (Ala. 1980), and State ex rel. Dep’t of Highways v. Bowles, 472 P.2d 896,
899-901 (Okla. 1970), with Stipe v. United States, 337 F.2d 818, 821 (10th Cir. 1964) (“The
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2. One-Way Traffic Flow and Median Dividers
Like traffic volume, the direction or pattern of traffic flow on an abutting road
does not give rise to a property right.280 Courts in general accept the principle that
regulation of vehicle movement on a public road does not affect any right of an
abutting landowner.
The use of median dividers to separate opposing streams of traffic illustrates this
principle most starkly: if vehicles cannot turn left into and out of a property, visitors
may find it less convenient to reach, and this could have an impact on both use and
value. Nonetheless, courts make no distinction between median barriers, “no left
turn” signs and pavement markings, and one-way streets. 281 Each of these methods
of controlling the directional flow of traffic is seen as a permissible exercise of the
police power, not a compensable interference with a property right.282
3. Accessibility within the Road Network
Drivers who must pass by a business due to a median barrier, turn around at a
crossover point, and then come back to reach their intended destination experience
what courts call “circuity of travel” or “circuity of access.” 283 Other alterations in
the road network, such as street closure or rerouting, the creation of overpasses, and
the use of service roads to replace direct highway access, can also result in a more
roundabout way of travel. Most courts hold that a road network change making a
property harder to reach is “mere circuity of travel,” not a compensable interference
with the access right.284
record as a whole discloses beyond any doubt that the decrease in the value of the business
resulted not from the taking of part of Stipe's land, but from the relocation of Highway 69,
which diverted traffic over the highway away from the business operation. Whatever his loss,
it is due to the destruction or frustration of his business, and not the taking of the property.
Such losses are not compensable.”).
280
See State v. Dunn, 888 N.E.2d 858, 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“Indiana is in the firm
majority of jurisdictions that have addressed whether the construction of medians in roadways
constitutes a compensable taking and have concluded that it does not.”); Dale Props., L.L.C. v.
State, 638 N.W.2d 763, 764 (Minn. 2002) (“[A] property owner who retains direct access to
traffic in one direction, although losing it in the other direction due to the closure of a median
crossover, retains reasonable access as a matter of law.”).
281
See State v. Kimco of Evansville, Inc., 902 N.E.2d 206, 215 (Ind. 2009) (“Neither the
construction of the median alone, nor the hypothetical conversion of Green River Road to a
one-way street, would have constituted a compensable taking by the State.”).
282

See Hales v. City of Kansas City, 804 P.2d 347, 350 (Kan. 1991) (“We conclude that
limiting the landowners' ingress and egress to lanes for southbound travel when they formerly
had direct access to both the northbound and southbound lanes of traffic, whether by a median
strip, one-way street, or no left turn, is a valid exercise of police power and is not
compensable.”).
283

A roundabout course to get to a particular destination is “circuitous.” The use of
“circuity” to describe what happens when property is harder to get to within the network of
roads is awkward, as the word is uncommon and easily confused with “circuitry.”
Nonetheless, this unfortunate usage is too long-established to be changed.
284

See, e.g., State ex rel. Preschool Dev., Ltd. v. City of Springboro, 792 N.E.2d 721, 725
(Ohio 2003) (“Mere circuity of travel, necessarily and newly created, to and from real
property does not of itself result in legal impairment of the right of ingress and egress to and
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This circuity rule is but another statement of a principle that has been part of the
law of access since its early days. Courts in the late nineteenth century did not make
the public pay for every change to the streets that impaired access: instead, they
required compensation only for those access-related damages that were special to the
property involved.285 Only if a street obstruction made it difficult to get between a
property and its abutting road were there (at least potentially) damages peculiar to
that property, which the law regarded as a compensable event.286
Conversely, a network-level change, such as the obstruction of a street some
distance away, did not cause special damages. Everyone who used the street, even
people who did not own property on it, suffered the same inconvenience. That fact
made any resulting damage general. Even though the owners of property along the
blocked street may experience the inconvenience to a greater degree, the kind of
damage sustained—namely, less convenient travel within part of the road network—
was not due to property ownership, but rather to membership in the affected
community. Accordingly, courts did not consider loss of accessibility within the
network to be a legal taking (or damaging) of property.287
Courts continue to find this distinction controlling. As the Colorado Supreme
Court explained:
The general rule is that an abutting landowner is entitled to compensation
for limitation or loss of access only if the limitation or loss substantially
interferes with his means of ingress and egress to and from his property.
In determining whether there has been substantial interference . . . we
have declared that inconvenience caused by the required use of a more
circuitous route to gain access to property does not constitute substantial
impairment of access. The rationale for denying compensation for
limitation or loss of access manifested by circuity of route is that the
inconvenience suffered by the landowner is identical in kind to that
suffered by the community at large, and the landowner's inconvenience is
only greater in degree.288

from such property.”) (internal citation omitted); Dep’t of Transp. v. Taylor, 440 S.E.2d 652,
654 (Ga. 1994) (explaining that a change to the road network causing inconvenience shared by
the public in general, such as a change “resulting in longer drive to reach a particular
destination,” is not a compensable taking of a property right); State v. Wood Oil Distrib., 751
S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. 1988) (“It is well settled that damages to a condemnee's business
which result merely from traffic being required to travel a more circuitous route to reach a
condemnee's property are not compensable.”); 4 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT
DOMAIN § 13.23(1) (rev. 3d ed., 1997) (“A change which results in inconvenience or a
circuity of access is generally held to be non-compensable.”).
285

See, e.g., Rude v. City of St. Louis, 6 S.W. 257, 257-59 (Mo. 1887).

286

See, e.g., Gilbert v. Greeley, Salt Lake & Pac. Ry. Co., 22 P. 814, 815-17 (Colo. 1889).

287

Id. at 816-17; Rude, 6 S.W. at 258-59.

288

State Dep't of Highways v. Davis, 626 P.2d 661, 664-65 (Colo. 1981). Judicial opinions
often use “ingress and egress” to describe the movement between property and an abutting
street. See also Miller v. Preisser, No. 103,938, 2012 Kan. LEXIS 460, at *38 (Kan. Aug. 31,
2012) (drawing a distinction “between direct access to abutting roadways, which creates a
right of access that is compensable in an eminent domain action, and indirect access to a
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One legal scholar has criticized the circuity-of-access rule as merely rhetorical.289
But doing so misses the rule’s real insight: that it differentiates between networklevel inconveniences and those that relate to access between a property and the road
it touches. If a property owner has a right of access to and from an abutting road, but
no right to demand that the linkages of the road network must stay the same, then the
circuity rule still performs a valuable function.
4. The Minority Approach: When a Location within the Network
Becomes too Remote
Courts frequently decide access claims by evaluating whether the property has
“reasonable access” after the government action at issue. Because “access” can have
multiple meanings, however, a reasonableness analysis can blur the distinctions
between access to land, access to traffic, and accessibility within the network of
roads.
Boehm v. Backes, for example, arose after the State of North Dakota closed the
intersection between a highway and the local street on which a towing and auto
repair business was located, creating a cul-de-sac.290 The business’s access to and
from the local street was unaffected, but the street no longer connected to the
highway; instead, the highway could only be reached “in the opposite direction via a
circuitous route through a residential neighborhood.”291 The trial court, applying the
usual circuity principle, dismissed the Boehms’ inverse condemnation suit.292 But
the North Dakota Supreme Court did not limit the focus of its “reasonableness”
analysis to the property’s access to the abutting street. Rather, it looked at the length
of the travel path to the main highway, concluding that there was a “substantial
interference with direct access to the nearby thoroughfare” which “resulted in a
compensable taking as a matter of law.”293
Similarly, in Palm Beach County v. Tessler, the Florida Supreme Court
considered the effects of a retaining wall, built within the public right-of-way, which
blocked a beauty salon’s driveway to the main road, forcing customers to take a
winding route through a residential neighborhood to reach the salon’s other
driveway.294 Each party contended for a bright-line rule:
Where there has been no taking of the land itself, when is a property
owner entitled to be compensated for loss of access to the property caused
by governmental intervention? The county argues that unless the property
owner has been deprived of all access, the law of eminent domain does
nearby roadway, which relates to a regulation of traffic flow that is not compensable in an
eminent domain action.”) (emphasis in original).
289

Stoebuck, supra note 107, at 744-45, 752.

290

Boehm v. Backes, 493 N.W.2d 671, 672 (N.D. 1992).

291

Id.

292

Id. (“The trial court also ruled . . . that the damage they ‘have suffered to their access is
a damage shared by the general public,’ and that their circuitous access was ‘not
unreasonable.’”).
293

Id. at 674 (emphasis added).

294

Palm Beach Cnty. v. Tessler, 538 So. 2d 846, 847-49 (Fla. 1989).
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not recognize that a taking has occurred. Respondents contend that a
taking has occurred when any portion of the access has been eliminated
and that the suitability of the remaining access may be taken into account
in the assessment of compensation.295
The court, however, rejected “both positions as being extreme.”296 Instead,
striving for a balance, the court looked at whether the remaining access was suitable
for the property as it was used by the business that occupied it:
[T]he fact that a portion or even all of one's access to an abutting road is
destroyed does not constitute a taking unless, when considered in light of
the remaining access to the property, it can be said that the property
owner's right of access was substantially diminished. The loss of the most
convenient access is not compensable where other suitable access
continues to exist.297
The Tessler court emphasized that loss of access to traffic could not be
considered in deciding whether access is suitable.298 But network-level access
apparently could be: the Tesslers showed a substantial loss of access to their beauty
salon, sufficient to prove a taking, by evidence that “the retaining wall will require
their customers to take a tedious and circuitous route to reach their business premises
which is patently unsuitable and sharply reduces the quality of access to their
property.”299
The blurring of distinctions between the various types of “access” is perhaps best
highlighted by the Kansas Supreme Court’s 1977 Teachers Insurance opinion.300
That case involved Kellogg Street, designated as U. S. Highway 54 and State
Highway 96, which was a major four-lane road through the City of Wichita.301
Public authorities decided to make it into a highway with fully controlled
295

Id. at 847.

296

Id.

297

Id. at 849. As the Tessler court noted, in Florida the ultimate question was a legal one:
“[T]he judge . . . decides as a matter of law whether the landowner has incurred a substantial
loss of access by reason of the governmental activity.” Id. at 850.
298

Id. at 849 (“A taking has not occurred when governmental action causes the flow of
traffic on an abutting road to be diminished.”).
299

Id. at 850. The actual use of land and its potential “highest and best use” are often
interwoven with access to traffic and convenience of access within the overall road network.
See discussion infra Part V.C. In Gefen, the expressway-ramp closure case discussed above,
the owners of a commercial property presented evidence that loss of convenient access to
Interstate 95 damaged the use and value of their property. Dep’t of Transp. v. Gefen, 636 So.
2d 1345, 1346 (Fla. 1994). But the Gefen court distinguished Tessler as involving not just
network-level access, but also loss of access from land to an abutting road. Id. (“However, the
facts of this case are significantly different from those in Tessler. Gefen's access to all roads
abutting her property is undiminished.”) Accordingly, the reach of the Tessler decision is
uncertain.
300

See generally Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n. of Am. v. City of Wichita, 559 P.2d 347
(Kan. 1977).
301

Id. at 351.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss3/5

48

2012]

ACCESS MANAGEMENT

633

(interchange-only) access and shift it to a new alignment slightly north of its old
location.302 The old roadway, renamed Kellogg Drive, was narrowed to a two-lane
street.303
Three commercial properties on Kellogg Drive were most affected by this
change. Their driveways still connected to the old roadway pavement in the same
places, but that pavement was now part of a five-block-long street, not a major
thoroughfare.304 U.S. 54 and State Highway 96, still visible across Kellogg Drive,
were now reachable only by a mile-long trek through several other streets.305
The businesses sued Wichita, contending that the highway project constituted “a
taking of their rights of access to a through street, Highway 54, Highway 96, and
through traffic . . . [and] that the circuity of travel under the new plan is
unreasonable.”306 The city, conversely, argued that no taking had occurred because
access to the portion of old Kellogg that abutted the properties was unchanged and,
in any event, the businesses had no right to the traffic flow that formerly passed in
front of their properties.307
The Kansas Supreme Court sided with the owners, for even though access
between the business properties and the street was unaltered, the street itself had
changed: it was no longer a highway, and it did not have a nearby connection to U.S.
54.308 Seeking to distinguish its prior decisions in traffic-flow cases, the court
declared that the highway had not truly been rerouted: it was just on the other side of
Kellogg Drive, but out of reach. That fact, in the court’s view, was tantamount to a
denial of access.309
Tellingly, the court then blended the concepts of access to land, accessibility
within the road network, and access to traffic, concluding that:
On the facts in the instant case we are dealing with two service stations
and a candy shop. These business properties are dependent upon access
to the new highway facility fronting these properties. In McCall Service
Stations, Inc. v. City of Overland Park, 215 Kan. 390, 524 P. 2d 1165, the
court stated: “. . . The value of a service station is dependent almost
entirely upon the access the traveling public has to the service station.”310
A subsequent decision by the Kansas Supreme Court distinguished the McCall
opinion, on which Teachers Insurance relied, as involving closure of a business

302

Id.

303

Id. at 350-52.

304

Id. at 351.

305

Id.

306

Id. at 352.

307

Id. at 353, 356.

308

Id. at 355-56.

309

Id. at 356 (“[W]hile the state is under no duty or obligation to send traffic past the
plaintiffs' properties, as long as the traffic does pass the plaintiffs' properties they are entitled
to avail themselves of it in common with other abutting property owners.”).
310

Id. at 356-57.
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entrance, denying that there had been any compensation for loss of traffic flow.311
And it characterized Teachers Insurance as a rather extreme situation in which the
public authority had stipulated that travel to and from the property was not
practical.312 Because the Kansas court has now squarely ruled that a network-level
change to the street system leading to a retail center was not a loss of access,313 the
continuing vitality of those earlier decisions is questionable. Nonetheless, they serve
to illustrate the confusion that can occur when a court is trying to determine whether
a property has reasonable access without first carefully defining what “access” is.
B. Access to Land: The Point of Contact Between the Public and Private Pavement
Thorny issues can also arise when a governmental action affects the ability to get
back and forth between land and an abutting road. That movement—the initial step
into the overall road network—is “access” in its elemental form: the interest that
courts have recognized since the nineteenth century. As we have seen, too, it was
the loss of this kind of access that courts have used to justify and distinguish
decisions that seemingly allowed compensation for loss of traffic flow or changes to
network-level access.314
There appears to be universal agreement that government preclusion of vehicular
access to any roadway is a taking that requires compensation. But when a property
has some vehicular access to a road, the analysis can be complicated.
1. Corner Parcels and Multiple Road Frontages
As foreshadowed by the Brownlow and Wood gas station decisions in the 1920s,
when a corner parcel is involved, public authorities may want to allow access to just
one of the intersecting roads to minimize interference with traffic.315 If the legallyrecognized interest is access to an abutting road, as in Wood, the decision would be
upheld as a permissible exercise of the police power—and one that does not rise to
the level of a taking.316 On the other hand, if a property owner has a legal right to
access each abutting road, as in Brownlow, then refusal of a driveway permit to
either, even if demonstrably in the public interest, would nonetheless be a taking
requiring just compensation.317
311

City of Wichita v. McDonald’s Corp., 971 P.2d 1189, 1199 (Kan. 1999).

312

Id.

313

Id. at 1198 (“Wal-Mart has misused the term ‘access’ in crafting its arguments. . . . The
City did not permanently close any of the entrances or exits to the property. Wal-Mart still has
four entrances located as they were before the project. In addition, Wal-Mart also has the same
access to the same streets it previously had.”); id. at 1198-99 (distinguishing statutory factors
that must be considered when awarding damages in an eminent domain case: “We will not
rewrite the [statutory] language ‘access to the property remaining’ to mean ‘access to the
highway remaining.’”).
314
Id. at 1199 (distinguishing McCall); Dep’t of Transp. v. Gefen, 636 So. 2d 1345, 1346
(Fla. 1994) (distinguishing Tessler).
315

See generally Brownlow v. O’Donoghue Bros., Inc., 276 F. 636 (D.C. Cir. 1921); Wood
v. City of Richmond, 138 S.E. 560 (Va. 1927).
316

Wood, 138 S.E. at 563.

317

Brownlow, 276 F. at 638.
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Not surprisingly, judicial opinions still go both ways on this issue. Some courts
hold that an abutter has a right to access each abutting road.318 Other states allow
public authorities to eliminate direct access to one street so long as there is another
means of vehicular access to the property.319 So, for example, a decision denying a
permit for a driveway from a fast-food restaurant to a high-volume state highway,
and requiring access from an abutting township road instead, can be sustained if it is
made pursuant to a reasonable and uniform policy.320 Similarly, an office complex’s
access to one street may be closed, provided that reasonable access is available from
another street.321
2. Parcels Fronting on a Single Road: What Access is Enough?
For parcels that have frontage on a single public road, the broad consensus now,
as in the 1910 decision in Goodfellow Tire, is that access may be regulated.322 In the
New Jersey Supreme Court’s words, “It seems to be . . . the general rule is that the
property owner is not entitled to access to his land at every point between it and the
highway, but only to free and convenient access to his property and the
improvements on it.”323 This rule invites the use of a “reasonableness” analysis to
318
See, e.g., Hilton Head Auto., L.L.C. v. S.C. Dep’t of Transp., 714 S.E.2d 308, 310
(S.C. 2011) (“As an abutting property owner, HHA had ‘an easement for access’ to Highway
278, ‘regardless of whether [it had] access to and from an additional public road.’”); Harper
Invs., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 554 S.E.2d 619, 622 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (“Although Harper
may have alternative access to its property on an abutting street . . . [this factor goes] to the
amount of damages, if any, due Harper for the ‘deprivation of one means of access to [its]
property.’”).
319

See, e.g., State v. Dawmar Partners, Ltd., 267 S.W.3d 875, 880 (Tex. 2008) (“In light of
the considerable amount of remaining access to and from the property, we could not conclude
that there is a material and substantial impairment of access . . . without imposing a
requirement that there be some degree of direct access to the highway. . . . We decline to
impose such a requirement because it would be inconsistent with our well-developed case law
regarding circuity of travel.”); Commonwealth v. Comer, 824 S.W.2d 881, 883-84 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1991) (noting that property at intersection still had access to one street, therefore no
taking occurred because the remaining access was reasonable); Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc. v.
Dep’t of Transp. of Pa., 434 A.2d 1209, 1211 (Pa. 1981) (“[M]unicipalities may, under the
police power, severely limit, or even eliminate, the right of direct access onto a public street—
at least where other available access exists.”).
320

Hardee’s, 434 A.2d at 1212.

321

City of San Antonio v. TPLP Office Park Props., 218 S.W.3d 60, 61, 66 (Tex. 2007).

322
Goodfellow Tire Co. v. Comm’r of Parks & Boulevards of Detroit, 128 N.W. 410, 412
(Mich. 1910).
323

State by Comm'r of Transp. v. Weiswasser, 693 A.2d 864, 873 (N.J. 1997) (citation
omitted); see also Shaklee v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 491 P.2d 1366, 1368 (Colo. 1971) (“[A]n
owner is not entitled, as against the public, to access to his land at every point on the property
line adjacent to the highway.”); State ex rel. Dep’t of Highways v. Linnecke, 468 P.2d 8, 9-10
(Nev. 1970) (“[A]n owner is not entitled to access to his land at all points in the boundary to it
and the highway, although entire access to his property cannot be cut off. If he has free and
convenient access to his property and his means of egress and ingress are not substantially
interfered with, he has no cause for complaint.”); State v. Ensley, 164 N.E.2d 342, 351 (Ind.
1960) (“The owners of abutting real estate are not entitled to ‘egress and ingress to their
premises for the full length of the abutment of said real estate upon such highway.’ Nor is an
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determine whether a governmental action that affects access, such as the closure of a
driveway, is significant enough to rise to the level of a taking. And reasonableness
is the measure many courts use.
The Texas Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Bristol Hotel Asset Co. provides
a good illustration.324 The Bristol Hotel had three entrance driveways before the
state began a highway project; afterward, the main driveway was so steep as to be
unusable, but one of the other driveways could be converted into the primary
entrance.325 These facts led the hotel’s appraiser to find over $500,000 in damages,
primarily due to the loss of the former main driveway: in his view it would cause
“some interruption in ‘traffic patterns’” and result in “new ‘site circulation
characteristics’ of the hotel [that] would be atypical.”326 The Texas court agreed that
access to the property not be as easy, but denied that there was a taking. Rather, it
found that the property “remained reasonably accessible because it retained two
other driveways fronting the hotel and modified to provide adequate access for
patrons, as well as two service driveways in the rear.”327 Because the hotel still had
reasonable access, the court concluded that the appraiser’s damages testimony was
improper.
What if a public authority decides, for safety or operational reasons, to relocate a
parcel’s driveway? Does access have to be direct from the frontage of the property
to the highway? Or may public authorities enlarge the road network by creating a
service road and use it to provide access to multiple parcels through a single
connection to the highway? The majority and dissenting opinions in the Ohio
Supreme Court’s 2003 Preschool Development decision outline the contending
positions.328
State Route 73 is the main commercial corridor through Springboro, Ohio. In
1999, a company called Preschool Development, Ltd. (PDL) began to convert a
parcel on that road from a residence to a daycare center. The city engineer, however,
determined that “although left turns in and out of PDL’s existing curb cut had been
abutting property owner entitled to damages merely for ‘a partial limitation and obstruction’
of the right of access. Such right must be substantially or materially interfered with or taken
away.”) (internal citation omitted); State Highway Dep't v. Strickland, 102 S.E.2d 3, 5 (Ga.
1958) (“[Abutting owners] are not entitled however, as against the public, to access to their
land at all points in the boundary between it and the highway if the entire access has not been
cut off, and if they are afforded a convenient access to their property and the improvements
thereon, and their means of ingress and egress are not substantially interfered with by the
public authorities in charge of the highway.”); Iowa State Highway Comm’n v. Smith, 82
N.W.2d 755, 759 (Iowa 1957) (“It seems fairly well settled that, while access may not be
entirely cut off, an owner is not entitled, as against the public, to access to his land at all points
between it and the highway. If he has free and convenient access to his property and the
improvements on it and his means of ingress and egress are not substantially interfered with
by the public he has no cause for complaint.”).
324

State v. Bristol Hotel Asset Co., 293 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. 2009).

325

Id. at 171. The third driveway required some regrading to restore its utility. Id.

326

Id. at 174.

327

Id.

328

See generally State ex rel. Preschool Dev., Ltd. v. City of Springboro, 792 N.E.2d 721
(Ohio 2003).
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acceptable for the low traffic volumes associated with a single-family residence,
these left turns would be hazardous for business-generated traffic volumes.”329
Springboro subsequently obtained a permanent easement through an adjacent
shopping plaza, then under construction, to provide a route for the daycare center
traffic to go through the plaza’s parking lot to a single common access point on State
Route 73.330 Finally, as part of a repaving project, the state closed off PDL’s
individual curb cut.
The company sued Springboro to compel it to bring an eminent domain action,
contending that the city’s elimination of the curb cut “denied its right of access to the
abutting public highway, S.R. 73, and constituted a compensable taking.”331 In Ohio
the right of access to an abutting public road is considered to be “a fundamental
attribute of ownership” and access to property “from the street or highway on which
it abuts cannot be lawfully destroyed or unreasonably affected.”332 Accordingly, a
“governmental action that substantially or unreasonably interferes” with a property
owner’s “right to access public streets or highways on which the land abuts” will
constitute “a taking of private property.”333
A majority of the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the idea “that a substantial or
unreasonable interference with access to abutting roads necessarily occurs when that
access no longer is direct from the frontage of the parcel itself.”334 Instead, it applied
the circuity-of-access rule:
It is true that PDL no longer has access to and from S.R. 73 directly from
its property. It does, however, have access to and from S.R. 73 via a route
that runs parallel to S.R. 73 from its property to the center line of the curb
cut of an adjacent shopping center . . . . The fact that drivers must
negotiate one additional turn and travel 207 feet along a secondary access
route rather than on S.R. 73 to reach the PDL parking lot does not warrant
a finding of a compensable taking.335
The dissenting justices, by contrast, believed that the right of access meant direct
access to the abutting roadway.336 Like the Brownlow and Teachers Insurance
opinions, the dissent in Preschool Development equated an element of property
value with the existence of a property right:

329

Id. at 723.

330

Id.

331

Id. at 724. Under Ohio law, inverse condemnation claims are brought as mandamus
actions. If the affected property owner proves to the court that a taking has occurred, the court
will issue a writ of mandamus directing the responsible government agency to file a lawsuit to
appropriate the property that it took. See generally State ex rel. Wasserman v. City of
Fremont, 960 N.E.2d 449 (Ohio 2012).
332

Preschool Development, 792 N.E.2d at 724 (internal citations omitted).

333

Id. at 725 (internal citation omitted).

334

Id. (emphasis added).

335

Id. at 724-25.

336

Id. at 727 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
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The PDL property will most likely not house a daycare center in
perpetuity. When the owners sell the property, would its value be
diminished without its own curb cut? When faced with properties in a
similar location, which would a buyer choose, the property with or
without its own access to the roadway? The age-old adage is that the
three most important considerations in determining the value of a piece of
property are location, location, and location. From the standpoint of real
estate values (excepting residential), direct access to a busy street or
highway is among the most important aspects of location.337
The dissent’s assertion about the value of direct access to a busy street is
somewhat overstated. Some land uses, such as retail, do seek locations that offer a
high volume of local traffic, visibility, and convenient accessibility within the road
network. But direct access to the main road is not required, as the proliferation of
mall out-lot development shows.
Other land uses, such as many office
developments, chiefly need access to the local road network and may not benefit
from traffic volume. Still others, such as industrial uses, often look for access to a
highway that provides rapid long-distance mobility; traffic volume is a detriment if it
interferes with trucks heading to and from the site. Yet the dissenting opinion does
underscore the problem that courts face when legal rules, such as the bar against
compensation for diminished traffic volume, conflict with what the real estate
market does. Since market-based evidence of use and value does not distinguish
between amenities that happen to be available to properties in a given area and
ownable rights that are specific to individual tracts of land, how should a court
evaluate whether access is reasonable?
C. How can Reasonable Access be Measured?
Access, as we have seen, has a physical dimension and another aspect that is
essentially economic. Any measurement of or decision about the reasonableness of
access must consider how the access is used. That factor depends, in turn, on the use
of the property: a commercial building with a loading dock for semis has different
access requirements than a beauty salon. Yet even that can be hard to pin down,
because how buildings and tracts of land are used changes over time.
The Texas Supreme Court’s recent Dawmar Partners decision is an excellent
example of how these issues can be analyzed and decided.338 Dawmar owned an
eighty-acre farm tract at highway FM 1695 and Ritchie Road on the outskirts of
Hewitt, Texas. The property had direct access to the highway and its frontage roads
until the state condemned thirteen acres to widen and elevate FM 1695. At the
condemnation trial, Dawmar gave expert evidence that, before the taking, the
“highest and best use of the property was to hold it for subsequent commercial
development.”339 The property remaining afterward still had access to two public

337

Id. Cf. Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 318-19 (1932) (rejecting takings-clause
challenge against use of a public park to build a fire station; although the park may have
enhanced the value of neighboring property “the existence of value alone does not generate
interests protected by the Constitution against diminution by the government”).
338

State v. Dawmar Partners, Ltd., 267 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. 2008).

339

Id. at 877.
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roads.340 Even so, Dawmar gave evidence that “loss of direct access to FM 1695
made the remainder suitable only for residential development.”341 The jury evidently
found this evidence to be persuasive, awarding over $400,000 in damages, and the
court of appeals affirmed.
On review, the Texas high court first asked whether diminished value resulting
from a change in the property’s highest and best use was independently
compensable: in other words, whether the government should have to pay whenever
its actions decrease the economic value of property. The court’s answer was
negative: “diminished value is compensable only when it derives from a
constitutionally cognizable injury.”342
Under Texas law in access cases, that threshold is crossed “only when access is
materially and substantially impaired.”343 So the next question was whether an
impairment of access that changed a property’s highest and best use was necessarily
material and substantial. The court rejected this proposition as well, because it was
too close to the diminished-value-as-taking concept: “it would be a rare case in
which a reduction of access would not have some impact on the value of property,
and the ‘material and substantial’ limitation would be effectively eliminated in the
vast majority of cases.”344 On the facts before it the court could hardly have reached
another conclusion, because the Dawmar property still had physical access to 3,992
feet of road frontage.345
This brought the Texas court to the final, critical question: whether the
reasonableness of access must be evaluated in light of the property’s highest and best
use. That standard, the court decided, was too speculative. Instead, its decisions
analyzed reasonableness of access “in light of the actual or intended uses of [the]
remainder property as reflected by existing uses and improvements and applicable
zoning.”346 Hypothetical development plans might be pertinent to appraised value,
but not to the threshold legal question: evidence that it would be more difficult to
install driveways to unimproved land, or that hypothetical development plans would
have to be modified, or that development would be less extensive and more
expensive, was “immaterial” to the legal issue of whether a taking had occurred.347
The Dawmar property was zoned for residential use and there was “no evidence of a
pending request for a zoning change, existing commercial development plans, or a
contract for commercial use.”348 Those facts, the court concluded, made “any future
commercial development . . . purely speculative.”349
340

Id.

341

Id. at 877.

342

Id. at 878.

343

Id.

344

Id.

345

Id. at 880.

346

Id. at 879.

347

Id.

348

Id. at 880.

349

Id. The Dawmar court’s rejection of highest and best use as the reference point for
determining reasonable access is significant for transportation planning. Highway designers
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Having rejected economic evidence as too conjectural, the Dawmar court then
turned to the physical dimension. The property still had “2,165 feet of access to Old
Ritchie Road” and would gain “1,827 feet of access to New Ritchie Road,” which
was to be built as a two-lane road with a center turn lane, curbs, and gutters.350 And
there was no evidence of existing driveways, drainage systems, or any other physical
features that would make access to these roads “impossible or impracticable.”351
Because of this “considerable amount of remaining access to and from the
property,” the court noted, it “could not conclude that there is a material and
substantial impairment of access . . . without imposing a requirement that there be
some degree of direct access to the highway.”352 Lack of access to an arterial road,
however, did not equate to a legal impairment of access, and the Dawmar court
declined to make it one, “because it would be inconsistent with our well-developed
case law regarding circuity of travel.”353
Dawmar involved vacant land, but access to improved properties can be
evaluated in a similar way. For example, when two commercial parcels in
Lexington, Kentucky lost direct access to a main thoroughfare but retained access to
a secondary road named Scott Street, the courts were called on to decide whether the
owners had been deprived of reasonable access.354 The appeals court told the lower
court to disregard the fact that vehicles on the main road would have to travel an
extra nine-tenths of a mile to get to the businesses.355 But it should consider physical
can see existing uses and improvements and plan for access to them. Existing zoning,
approved site plans, and comparable acts of local land-use agencies are matters of public
record and knowable by the highway authorities. The concept of “highest and best use,” by
contrast, is rather fluid. Appraisers screen a property’s potential uses to determine which of
them are legally permissible, physically possible, and financially feasible. Of these, the one
that is maximally productive (that results in the highest value) is the highest and best use.
These tests are applied, in order, to “develop adequate support for [a] highest and best use
opinion.” APPRAISAL INST., THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 278-79 (13th ed. 2008) (emphasis
added). Professional appraisers routinely have differing opinions about highest and best use.
Notably, too, the property’s existing zoning is not determinative: an appraiser may conclude
that market participants would pay more for a parcel than its current zoning would justify and
hold it in anticipation of a zoning change. Id. at 282; see, e.g., Masheter v. Kebe, 359 N.E.2d
74, 77 (Ohio 1976) (“[A]s a practical matter, the existing zoning regulation does not and may
not control the market value of the property involved. If, in the opinion of an expert appraisal
witness, an informed, willing purchaser would be presently agreeable to pay more than an
amount justified under existing zoning, such evidence is admissible [at trial in an eminent
domain action] because it reflects upon the fair market value of the property.”). Since highest
and best use is a matter of opinion, not fact, it is not a reliable touchstone for highway
planning and design.
350

Dawmar, 267 S.W.3d at 880.

351

Id.

352

Id. (emphasis added).

353

Id.

354

Commonwealth v. Comer, 824 S.W.2d 881, 882 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991).

355

Id. at 883 (“It is well-settled law in Kentucky that reasonable restriction of access,
rerouting of public highways, and circuity of travel caused thereby are not legally
compensable.”).
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access to the business properties: evidence “that Scott Street does not meet modern
vehicular requirements, or that it was impassable at certain times, or that it provided
insufficient driveway space for commercial vehicles, or that [Scott Street] in some
way other than circuity was not reasonable access.”356
Beginning the reasonableness-of-access inquiry with physical factors, and
evaluating those factors in light of existing uses, improvements, and zoning, helps to
clarify what is really at issue in an access case.
At the most basic level of inquiry, is vehicular movement into and out from the
property still possible after the access change? Is there a driveway, or can one
reasonably be built, to connect the property to a public road? Does that road link up
to the overall road network? If so, then the property has access in the fundamental
sense.357
The next level of inquiry considers how an access change affects improvements
on the property. If there is pavement within the property (such as a parking lot) that
is meant for vehicular use, is there a travel path between that pavement and a public
road, or can one reasonably be built? Can the kinds of vehicles that normally would
be expected to use the property enter and exit the site and move about on the
pavement within it, or would it be practicable to modify the on-site pavement to
allow those movements?358 Looking out into the road network, are the physical
characteristics of a public road to which a driveway connects, and those of a travel
path to the general system of roads, adequate for the kinds of vehicles that normally
would be expected to use the improved property? If so, then the improvements have
access in the expanded sense first recognized in the early Ohio decisions.359
356

Id. at 882 (emphasis added).

357

Cf. Lexington & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Applegate, 38 Ky. 289, 294 (1839) (stating that a
private right in the street is legally attached to the contiguous lots or contiguous ground).
358
Courts differ on how to treat the relationship between on-site improvements and access.
In one recent Minnesota appellate case, for example, the court decided that closure of an
access point leading to a gravel pit was not a taking because gravel trucks could reach and
enter the property at a different location. The alternate entrance was close to the owners’
house and apparently not constructed for use by heavy trucks. Even so, the court framed the
issue as “whether there is a reasonably convenient and suitable point of access connecting the
perimeter of landowners’ property to a public roadway,” reasoning that “[t]he convenience
and suitability of ingress and egress pertains to the path between the abutting road and the
parcel’s perimeter, not to a preferred point on the interior of the property.” Oliver v. State,
760 N.W.2d 912, 917 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added). An Ohio appellate court, by
contrast, found a taking to occur when some newly-installed curbing, which narrowed the
driveways into a gas station, required the gasoline tankers that made deliveries to back into or
out of the property. State ex rel. Thieken v. Proctor, 904 N.E.2d 619, ¶ 18 (Ohio Ct, App.
2008). In that court’s view, the curb so “limited the tanker trucks' ability to access and leave
the property” that it “substantially or unreasonably interfered with [the owner’s] right of
access,” resulting in a taking under Ohio law. Id. at ¶¶ 18-21. Each of these examples deals
with the convenience of movement within the property after an access change. In Minnesota,
the fact that gravel trucks could still reach and enter the property was dispositive: there was no
taking even though travel within the property to the gravel pit had become more difficult. In
Ohio, by contrast, gasoline tankers could still reach and enter the property and make
deliveries, but the court found a taking because the tankers’ exiting movement was
cumbersome.
359
Cf. Crawford v. Village of Delaware, 7 Ohio St. 459, 470 (1857) (holding that an
abutter who erected buildings in reasonable reliance on the established grade of a street had a
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At this point, any inquiry related strictly to access should end. The land itself has
access to an abutting public road. And if the law extends to improvements on the
land, as it does in a number of states, then they too have access to an abutting public
road.360
The few judicial decisions that took their analysis beyond this level got into a
different subject: the convenience of access to a given property as it is situated
within the overall road network. The towing business in Boehm and the beauty shop
in Tessler still had access that was physically adequate to serve both land and
improvements.361 What changed was the distance traveled to reach an arterial street
or highway. Most courts do not consider the convenience of access to an arterial
thoroughfare, standing alone, to be a constitutionally-protected property interest.
Finally, there is access to traffic volume. A great weight of judicial authority
rejects any assertion of an abutter’s right to traffic on the road. Yet real estate
experts know that a high volume of local traffic is good for most commercial
development, while heavy through traffic benefits retail developments that serve
regional areas.362 When property value is damaged by a loss of traffic, savvy
claimants often will frame the issue as one of “access” or “loss of frontage.” But if
analysis shows that the same damage would result if physical access was unaltered
but the traffic disappeared, then the true problem is not access, but lack of traffic.
With these principles in mind, we will next consider how the law should resolve
the disputes that will arise when an owner of abutting property wants to gain access
to a public road in a way that clashes with access management regulations. The
following part of this Article will address how specific methods of access
management fit within the framework of the law of access. Then, more broadly, the
Article will view access from the perspective of the road and explain why some
asserted “access rights” merit scant legal protection because they amount to private
claims, adverse to the public interest, in the commons of the roadway.
property right of access to the buildings that would constrain the public from materially
changing the street grade without paying compensation).
360

See, e.g., State by Comm'r of Transp. v. Weiswasser, 693 A.2d 864, 873 (N.J. 1997) (a
property owner is entitled “to free and convenient access to his property and the
improvements on it”); Iowa State Highway. Comm’n v. Smith, 82 N.W.2d 755, 760-61 (Iowa
1957) (holding that two access points were reasonable for filling station and cafe; adjacent
residential parcel owned by the Smiths needed to have its own access point so the residential
tenants would not have to share the filling station driveways). A problem lurks here, though:
some sites are laid out so that vehicles cannot exit from the same driveway that they entered.
By designing the site this way, the developer externalized onto the public roadway a vehicle
movement (turning around) and a traffic conflict point that, by current standards, should have
been kept on-site. Does this mean that the owner should have a right to two driveways while a
neighbor, whose site can function with a single driveway, has a right to only one? Why
should the first owner’s decision about how to lay out his buildings and driveways enlarge the
scope of his right, as against the public, in the roadway? This externalization of vehicle
conflicts (and development costs) is discussed in more depth infra Part VI.B.
361

See supra Part V.A.4. (discussing the Boehm, Tessler, and Teachers Insurance cases).
The gas stations in Teachers Insurance may not have had physically adequate access: the
opinion does not disclose whether the new travel path within the street system would
accommodate tank trucks for gasoline deliveries.
362

THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE, supra note 349, at 222.
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VII. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW OF ACCESS FOR ACCESS MANAGEMENT
PROGRAMS
In past years, the commons of the roadway was freely available for access to
land. On collector-type roads, with low speeds and low traffic volumes, frequent
driveways were not a problem. But arterial roads, which carried greater volumes of
traffic going longer distances at higher speeds, were a different story. Highway
planners came to see that entering and exiting vehicles impeded the ability of an
arterial road to handle through traffic.363
Even so, the traffic volume and easy mobility offered by an arterial road made
property along it attractive for commercial development. Many areas along arterial
roads were developed in an era when driveways “were simply built wherever
someone wanted one.”364 Individually, each new development—and each new
demand on the roadway for access to it—was economically rational for the abutting
landowner, and the added burden to the roadway caused by one or two more
driveways did not seem large.365 Yet every new conflict point consumed a bit more
of the arterial road’s traffic-handling capacity. Ultimately, the unbridled use of
arterial roads for land access resulted in their degradation: a classic tragedy of the
commons.
Access management is a reassertion of public control over the commons of the
roadway. This message comes through clearly in the legislative findings of states
adopting comprehensive access management legislation. In New Jersey, for
example, the legislature declared that the state highway system’s purpose was to
serve as a network of principal arterial routes; that the state had a public trust
responsibility to manage these highways to preserve their functional integrity; and

363

See supra Part III.

364

DEMOSTHENES, supra note 188, at 4. In some strip-type development, small residential
lots fronting on a main road were at first converted directly to commercial use. Later on, the
demand for off-street parking led to redevelopment, with individual lots being consolidated
into larger commercial parcels. THE GAS STATION IN AMERICA, supra note 125, at 209-17
(describing the growth of a commercial strip). In the initial stage, each small parcel had its
own driveway, as each needed access. As parcels were consolidated, parking lots typically
were built in front of the commercial structures. This process, however, did not necessarily
result in a significant change in the number of driveway connections to the road: decisions
about how many driveways each parcel would have, and where they were located, were
typically made for the benefit of the redeveloped site, not the roadway.
365
A property developer adding one driveway connection to an arterial road, like a herder
adding one sheep to a common pasture, may not perceive that his action has any adverse
impact on the public resource, but individually little actions with a big aggregate impact are
the very hallmark of a tragedy of the commons. The small scope of discrete acts is also no
barrier to regulation that is necessary (and justifiable) because of their aggregate or cumulative
effect. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (reaffirming that Commerce Clause
regulatory power extends to activities, such as individual marijuana use, which Congress had a
rational basis to conclude would “taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate
commerce”); Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 344 F.3d 832, 869-72 (9th Cir.
2003) (upholding regulation of stormwater runoff from small construction sites; even if
cumulative effect of small discharges was not quantified, EPA may write preventative
regulations to protect water quality).
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that land development activities and unrestricted access to state highways can impair
their purpose and damage the public investment in them.366
Similarly, the state of Washington predicated its decision to adopt an access
management program on a finding that “uncontrolled access to the state highway
system is a significant contributing factor to the congestion and functional
deterioration of the system.”367 As part of the enabling act, its legislature declared
that, “The access rights of an owner of property abutting the state highway system
are subordinate to the public's right and interest in a safe and efficient highway
system.”368 Other legislatures have made equivalent statements about the need to use
access management to protect the functioning of their states’ arterial highways.
In a sense, the term “access management” is somewhat of a misnomer. From the
perspective of the roadway, what is happening is traffic flow management:
specifically, the management of where and how streams of traffic enter, exit, and
move within the flow of traffic on the road. One means of accomplishing this is by
regulating the location and design of intersecting driveways and streets. Another
means is by governing the volume of traffic that can enter and exit the main flow—
for example, by allowing high-volume streams to enter at signalized intersections
only. Viewed from the perspective of the adjoining land, however, many of these
methods to manage traffic flow on the roadway have the effect of regulating access
to property.
In any event, as public authorities implement access management programs they
will confront property owners whose expectations were formed in a day when access
to roads was largely unregulated. For developing (or redeveloping) tracts of land
there will be fewer obstacles to overcome, since new buildings and other site
features can be planned with access management policies in mind. In alreadydeveloped areas, however, some sites—perhaps many sites—will have driveway
connections to arterial roads that do not conform to the new access policies. In that
setting the public interest in preserving the commons, by managing arterial roads to
preserve their traffic-carrying purpose, will collide with private investment decisions
predicated on using that commons for a conflicting land-access purpose.
As the next section will show, many access management techniques can be
implemented without impacting any legally-recognized access right. Others,
however, may pose legal issues in some jurisdictions. The following sections will
suggest ways in which the private right of access may have been overstated and give
reasons why the public’s right to manage its transportation system deserves greater
weight.
A. The Application of Specific Access Management Techniques
Perhaps the easiest access management technique to apply is the use of median
dividers to eliminate a major source of traffic conflicts (and accidents) by preventing
left turns. The use of median dividers is squarely supported by well-established law.
They do not infringe on any recognized property right. The use of other methods,
such as driveway design, to restrict vehicle movements to right turns in and out has
not been considered by the courts. Since right-turn-only driveways accomplish the
366

N.J. STAT. § 27:7-90 (West 2010).

367

WASH. REV. CODE 47.50.010 (West 2010).

368

Id.
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same purpose and have the same effect on abutting property as median dividers,
however, the same legal principles should apply to them.
The construction of dedicated turn lanes within the road right-of-way, to separate
exiting vehicles from through traffic and provide merging space for ones that are
entering, raises no constitutional or property-rights issues. Whether an abutting
property owner can be required to pay for that construction, however, or to transfer
to the public the additional right-of-way needed for a turn lane, raises questions
outside the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that if the government requires a
property owner to transfer land or pay money as a condition of permit approval,
there must be a rational connection between the permitted activity and how the land
or money is used; there must also be a rough proportionality between the size of the
land transfer or payment and the impact of the permitted activity on the public
resources.369 Since access management codes typically require permit applications
for large-volume driveways to include a professional traffic impact study, these
concerns should be addressed as part of the permit process.
From a design standpoint, the use of service roads to provide access to multiple
parcels through a single connection to an arterial highway is an elegant solution to
the access/mobility dilemma. In those states that adhere to the “circuity” rule, the
substitution of access to a publicly-maintained service road for direct access to the
main thoroughfare should be viewed as a permissible change to the road network,
not a compensable interference with property rights. Even in states that have moved
away from a bright-line rule against compensating for increased circuity of travel,
courts have sustained the use of a service road if the travel path to the main
highway—considered together with any other roadway access—is reasonably
suitable to the property’s use.
When a parcel with frontage on two roads is allowed to connect to the less
traveled one only, the legal analysis in most jurisdictions should be like that for a
service road. Courts in a few states, however, do consider the access right to apply
to each abutting road;370 in those jurisdictions a taking will likely be found unless
right-in and right-out access to the busier road is also allowed.
369
See, e.g., David L. Callies & Glenn H. Sonoda, Providing Infrastructure for Smart
Growth: Land Development Conditions, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 351, 356-65 (2007) (describing
“rational nexus” and “rough proportionality” requirements for land development conditions).
370

There can be a definitional question about what the abutting road is. During the heyday
of the freeway-building era, “outer roadways” were sometimes built within an existing
highway right of way and used to provide land access, while the inner lanes became a limitedaccess highway that connected to the outer roadways at interchanges only. In effect, the outer
and inner roadways were a single public facility with “through” and “local” lanes. Access to
the local part (the outer roadway) was viewed as access to the abutting road, and the
separation between the local and through lanes was analogous to a median divider. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Brockfeld, 388 S.W.2d 862, 864-65 (Mo. 1965)
(preclusion of access to through lanes “without compensation to an abutter who is furnished
unrestricted right of access to a lane of the highway upon which his property abuts and which
connects to the restricted lanes at designated points” was not a taking; abutters had access to
the “outer road” along the entire front of their property; “any compensation resulting from this
situation would have to be for circuity of travel rather than for loss of access to the highway”).
As the Brockfeld court perceptively noted, “[t]he real basis for complaint of an abutting
owner, which makes a difference to him if he operates a commercial enterprise, is diversion of
traffic,” but the abutter “has no right to a continuation of the flow of traffic directly in front of
his property.” Id. at 865.
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A somewhat different question is presented when an access management code
will allow direct highway access for a low-volume driveway, such as might serve a
residential property or a small office, but requires side-road or other indirect access
for a high-volume driveway. In that case direct access to the highway is regulated—
based on the traffic volume of the proposed driveway—but not denied. If the access
management rule is being applied on a prospective basis, so long as some land uses
qualify for direct access to each highway, even those jurisdictions that recognize a
legal right of access to every abutting road should be less inclined to find a taking.
Yet another access management tool is the use, by neighboring property owners,
of a single shared driveway connection to an arterial road. Like many other
methods, the shared-driveway concept is most readily applied to a new development
or redevelopment, where neighbors often enter into reciprocal easements for access,
parking, the operation of common areas, and similar matters.371 Required sharing of
a driveway as a condition of site plan approval for the enlargement of an existing use
has been allowed, provided that reasonable limits on “neighboring” traffic volume
were applied.372 It has also been upheld as a permit condition where each neighbor
that would be sharing the proposed driveway had alternative, if less desirable, access
to another road.373 When there is no alternative access, however, a court may well
find the denial of any permitted connection to be a taking: if the neighbors do not
agree to a shared driveway, then some other form of access, such as a right-in and
right-out driveway, would have to be allowed to each of them.374
It is not uncommon for access management tools, such as the installation of
medians and the reconfiguration of driveway connections, to be implemented along
with a general street or highway improvement project. If the government uses its
eminent domain power to acquire land for the project, there is a risk that the effects
of police-power actions affecting access, which would not be compensable standing
on their own, may become intermingled with the effects of the taking when just
compensation is being determined. Most judicial decisions that have squarely faced
this problem require the two matters to be kept separate: a change in access to
property that is not in itself a taking cannot be considered when determining
compensation for another act that is a taking.375
371

See, e.g., Gary A. Glick & Scott L. Grossfeld, Applying Reciprocal Easement
Agreements to Retail Projects, 31 L.A. LAWYER 18, Nov. 2008, at 18 (discussing use of
reciprocal easement agreements in retail development).
372

See Holmes v. Planning Bd., 433 N.Y.S.2d 587 (App. Div. 1980).

373

See Paradyne Corp. v. State, 528 So. 2d 921, 926-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).

374
Where design considerations allow one, neighboring property owners might agree to a
joint full-movement driveway in lieu of individual right-in and right-out connections.
375

See, e.g., State v. Marlton Plaza Assocs., L.P., 44 A.3d 626, 642-43 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2012) (claim for impaired internal traffic flow in shopping center improper in
eminent domain case; it should have been raised in previous administrative driveway closure
proceeding, and the driveway closure itself did not amount to a taking); State v. Kimco of
Evansville, Inc., 902 N.E.2d 206, 215 (Ind. 2009) (partial taking did not “[open] the door” to
damages claim for impaired shopping center traffic flow that resulted from the construction of
a median divider); County of Anoka v. Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d 331, 334-35 (Minn.
1997) (Even if a prospective buyer would consider access to traffic, the court was “not
persuaded that the policy of evidentiary inclusiveness in market value determinations should
overcome the longstanding rule that loss of traffic access from the construction of a median is

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss3/5

62

2012]

ACCESS MANAGEMENT

647

Perhaps the most difficult problem is presented by densely-developed areas
where parcels have access to an arterial road only and there is little room for physical
changes within the road right-of-way. In such places the only option may be to
“grandfather” existing connections that were lawful when built, and to defer required
compliance with the access management code until a driveway’s traffic volume
increases (due, for example, to a change in or expansion of the property’s use). New
zoning rules have been applied in this fashion for many years and in that context the
method has solid legal support.376
This method, by tolerating the continued use of already-built improvements but
preventing enlargement of the nonconformity, allows new access regulations to be
phased in as land uses change and the useful life of existing buildings comes to an
end. At that point, any reliance interest would be small, as structures built with
reference to the old access regulations have little current value. Furthermore, even if
the original permit is treated like an implicit agreement to let the owner to perpetuate
the driveway, the new use—with its increased traffic volume and correspondingly
greater impact on the roadway—alters the agreement’s terms in a way that should
allow the public authorities to revisit it.377
not a compensable taking,” and letting the owners “introduce traffic access into the
determination of market value would allow them to do indirectly what they cannot do directly:
be compensated for the loss of traffic access from one side of the roadway when they retain
access to the other side.”); 4A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN §
14A.01(6)(a) (rev. 3d ed., 1997) (“[T]he state may . . . concurrent with a compensable taking
in a condemnation proceeding, validly exercise the police power for traffic control and public
safety for which there may be no compensation, even if it affects the method of ingress and
egress to the affected property.”). Courts that take the opposite tack give primacy to
compensation without asking the logically prior question as to whether there is anything to be
compensated for. E.g., State v. Moore, 382 So.2d 543, 545 (Ala. 1980) (allowing evidence of
loss in traffic flow to business resulting from a partial condemnation and construction of a
median divider, “not as a separate item of damage, but as a circumstance ‘to enter into the
question of the effect of the [taking] upon the entire tract’”).
376

See, e.g., In re P.M.S. Assets, Ltd. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 774 N.E.2d 204, 205
(N.Y. 2002) (holding that the zoning board properly found that new owner’s lighting and
design business impermissibly exceeded the scope of the previous nonconforming moving and
storage use: “While nonconforming uses of property are tolerated, the overriding policy of
zoning is aimed at their eventual elimination.”); Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the
Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1235-38 (2009) (discussing
amortization of prior nonconforming uses).
377

By their terms, driveway permits are often explicitly revocable, and courts normally do
not view them as contracts. See, e.g., City of Winston-Salem v. Robertson, 344 S.E.2d 838,
839 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that driveway permit was a regulatory action undertaken
for safety purposes, not an agreement for the owner to retain access at a particular point).
Nonetheless, an owner affected by a permit revocation may argue estoppel as a reason to
prevent a driveway closure. See, e.g., City of San Antonio v. TPLP Office Park Props., 218
S.W.3d 60, 67 (Tex. 2007) (“TPLP argues that justice requires application of the doctrine of
estoppel in this case because the City approved the driveway by approving the plat depicting it
in 1975, and TPLP likely would have relied on the plat to confirm access to the property when
it decided to purchase the property and spend over $1 million on improvements.”). Like
reliance, however, estoppel and other fairness-based arguments lose their force when the
property owner wants to change the status quo by significantly altering the use of the property
and the driveway.
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B. Direct Access to Arterial Roads as an Appropriation of the Commons
to Private Use
Zoning law has been explained as a way of making sure that purely private landuse decisions do not end up producing “a right thing in the wrong place,” like a
factory in the midst of a residential neighborhood.378 Access management is
somewhat like that: one of its aims is to concentrate the land access function onto
collector-type roads and thereby prevent it from causing conflicts with traffic
mobility on arterial-type roads. Yet unlike zoning, which regulates the use of private
property, access management regulates the use of public property by specifying
where and how vehicular connections to the roads can be made. Accordingly, courts
normally have not applied the law of regulatory takings to roadway access issues.379
378

See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (The propriety of a zoning
regulation, “like the question whether a particular thing is a nuisance, is to be determined, not
by an abstract consideration of the building or of the thing considered apart, but by
considering it in connection with the circumstances and the locality. A nuisance may be
merely a right thing in the wrong place,-like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard. If the
validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative
judgment must be allowed to control.”) (internal citations omitted).
379
Garrett v. City of Topeka seems to be the only case in which a state’s high court used
regulatory-takings analysis to decide an access-related claim. Garrett v. City of Topeka, 916
P.2d 21 (Kan. 1996). In Garrett an owner of property that was suitable for commercial
development sued in inverse condemnation after the city enacted legislation prohibiting
commercial driveways to certain arterial streets and then failed to complete an interior “ring
road” that was meant to provide alternate access. Id. at 26-29. In its majority opinion, the
Kansas Supreme Court decided that the facts stated a claim for an economic regulatory taking.
Id. at 31-35. It then employed a balancing test—the details of which it did not articulate—and
concluded that a regulatory taking had occurred because the economic burden on the property
owner outweighed the public benefit from the city’s actions. Id. at 35-36. The Garrett dissent
argued that regulatory takings law did not apply because the city’s actions did not regulate
how the owner could use her land; rather, the case involved restriction of access to an abutting
street, an area of law that had its own well-developed body of cases. Id. at 38-39 (McFarland,
J., dissenting). In subsequent decisions the Kansas court limited Garrett to its facts,
emphasizing the importance of Topeka’s failure to complete the commercial “ring road”
despite assessing the owner for the project. See Eberth v. Carlson, 971 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Kan.
1999) (“We limit the application of Garrett to its specific facts.”); City of Wichita v.
McDonald’s Corp., 971 P.2d 1189, 1200 (Kan. 1999) (noting that the “‘economic impact’
analysis espoused by Garrett was new to condemnation cases in Kansas”). A recent New
Jersey appellate decision considered access law within the Penn Central regulatory-takings
framework. The appeals court reasoned that, because a property owner “does not have an
absolute right to access the highway from any particular point on his or her property,” the
owner’s “interests in any particular access point are not sufficiently bound up with their
reasonable expectations of ownership to constitute ‘property’ for Fifth Amendment purposes.”
From this, it followed that “modification or revocation of an access point, so long as free and
reasonable access remains, does not constitute a [regulatory] taking.” State v. Marlton Plaza
Assocs., L.P., 44 A.3d 626, 636-37 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) (citing Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978). The appeals court might also
have concluded that, since there is no right to access at a particular point, the owner could
have no “distinct investment-backed expectation” with regard to the particular driveway
location. Cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124, 127 (discussing “distinct investmentbacked expectations” in the regulatory-takings analysis). In any event, the Garrett dissent’s
point remains valid: the Penn Central analysis should not apply because governmental control
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Instead, an independent body of law has developed in this area, with courts typically
seeking to determine whether the access allowed by the government is reasonable.380
Disputes about access nearly always arise in a setting where a property owner is
seeking relief due to some governmental action, so it is not surprising that most case
law focuses on the private property abutting the road and the property owner’s
rights. But the question should be viewed from the other perspective, as well. In the
context of access management, what are the public’s rights? Does a right of access
to a way that is open to public travel necessarily encompass access to a multimillion-dollar transportation facility? To what extent can the public resist private
claims to the roadway that conflict with the public interest?
Suppose a vacant parcel of land at the corner of an arterial road and a collector
road is being developed with a fast food restaurant. The restaurant will handle a
large amount of vehicle traffic, generating 240 trips per hour at the evening peak.381
The site could be laid out so that vehicles reach it from the collector road, or it could
be laid out with access from the arterial road. Either layout provides a travel path
that is physically adequate for the types of customer and delivery vehicles that
normally go to a fast food restaurant. In most jurisdictions, either site layout would
have “access” as a matter of law. So if an access management code mandated the
use of the collector road access option, public authorities could require the site to be
developed that way and not face a takings claim.
Suppose, however, that the jurisdiction is one where a property owner has an
access right to each abutting road. There, even though collector road access would
be entirely adequate for the parcel’s intended use, prohibiting a driveway to the
arterial road would abridge a property right. In that setting the access right
encompasses more than just physically suitable access: it also entails a right to draw
traffic directly from, and to discharge traffic directly onto, an abutting arterial road.
Viewed from within the proposed restaurant site, that version of the access right
means convenient customer access. But viewed from the arterial road, it means
traffic conflicts—four conflicts a minute during evening rush hour, detracting from
the road’s finite capacity to handle through traffic. In addition to physically suitable
access, then, the abutter in that jurisdiction has a right to consume highway capacity
by creating traffic conflicts on an arterial road. If direct access to an arterial (or
compensation for the loss of it) can be insisted upon, even when another adequate
means of access is available, then the law has allowed abutting businesses to stake a
claim to the roadway commons that is adverse to the general public.
of a public road (and access to it) differs fundamentally from regulation directed at private
property, even though access decisions may incidentally affect how private property
practically can be used. Cf. Clifton v. Village of Blanchester, 964 N.E.2d 414, ¶ 24 (Ohio
2012) (“[W]hen a government’s . . . regulation of property causes incidental damage to an
adjacent but unregulated property, the damage is not attributable to the government actor for
the purpose of supporting a takings claim.”).
380

What “access” is, and how “reasonable access” is evaluated, are two important matters
in this determination that have received little systematic inquiry. This Article is meant to
contribute to a better understanding of those subjects.
381

The hypothetical trip rate is drawn from Table 1 of the San Diego Land Development
Code’s Trip Generation Manual. SAN DIEGO MUNICIPAL CODE, LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE:
TRIP
GENERATION
3-6
(rev.
May
2003),
available
at
http://www.sandiego.gov/planning/pdf/tripmanual.pdf.
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Let us suppose, instead, that the law of the jurisdiction requires reasonable access
only, and that the restaurant was built thirty years ago with driveways to both roads.
Suppose, also, that the local government is planning a road project in which the
driveway to the arterial road will be closed off and the driveway to the collector road
widened to handle the additional traffic. This new arrangement will be physically
adequate for customer and delivery vehicles, and the site improvements (the
building, the drive-through window, the parking lot) will still function for their
intended purpose. Most courts should view it as “reasonable” or “suitable” access.
Some, however, might think the governmental act of closing the driveway to the
arterial road must be a taking of some sort. Yet why should the result be any
different than the vacant-land hypothetical?
The answer might be that the court is protecting a reliance interest: it believes
that developed property oriented to arterial-road access should be left undisturbed.
This still means, however, that the abutting owner is allowed a right to use the
roadway commons in a manner that is adverse to the public. Although the court may
be rejecting new claims for direct driveway connections to the arterial when other
access is available, it is honoring claims that were staked in the past—even though
the traffic conflicts they create are avoidable. If so, then a past arrogation to private
use of the common resource of roadway capacity is given precedence over present
efforts to conserve that resource.
As the 1947 Public Roads Administration study showed, strip-type commercial
development has had a significantly negative effect on the traffic-handling capacity
of arterial roads since the early days of the automotive era.382 Yet back then, and still
for decades afterward, real estate developers grabbed up roadway capacity that was
freely available. Instead of creating internal streets to provide access to individual
lots, developers were allowed to use public roads for that function, splitting off lots
along the frontage. Small commercial parcels might have multiple driveways; each
parking lot aisle or even every parking space might have its own connection to the
public road. Under the permissive circumstances of that era, developers did not have
to bear the cost of providing a paved surface for access to the lots they split off, nor
were they required to create lots that were large enough to keep on-site all the
movements of vehicles using the site. Rather, they were allowed to externalize those
vehicle movements—and the conflicts with through traffic that they engendered—to
the public roadway.383
Going back to our hypothetical, we have assumed our fast-food restaurant has (or
will have) ingress and egress via a collector road that is physically suitable for its
vendors and patrons. If the restaurant also a right of direct access to the arterial road,
it might be framed as follows: in addition to having access that is physically
adequate for the property’s use, the abutter has a right to create four vehicle conflicts
382

See supra Part III.

383

The Montana Supreme Court recently dealt with this externalization problem in an
inverse condemnation case that arose when a highway widening project caused an abutting
owner, Faith Malipeli, to lose the ability to turn vehicles around in a previously-unused part of
the public right-of-way. Malipeli v. State, 2012 MT 181, ¶¶ 1-8, 366 Mont. 69, ¶¶ 1-8 (2012).
The court decided as a matter of law that Malipeli had “no property interest in the use of the
public right-of-way to turn her vehicles around,” id. at ¶ 25, because “it is up to the landowner
to provide enough room on his or her property to maneuver vehicles” into position for a safe
movement onto the highway. Id. at ¶¶ 23, 25-27.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss3/5

66

2012]

ACCESS MANAGEMENT

651

per minute on the arterial roadway. Viewed in that way, a preeminent “right” of
direct access appears to be an unwarranted intrusion into the arterial road, and
perhaps an unsafe one as well if the vehicle conflicts result in accidents.384
C. Accessibility: Claiming a Property Interest in the Road Network
As we have seen, for well over a century courts have drawn a distinction between
access to land—the right to ingress and egress—and accessibility within the road
network. Early cases drew the line between special damages arising from the loss of
access to land, which were compensable, and general damages resulting from a loss
of accessibility within the road network, which were not. Today most courts still
reject network-level access-loss claims under the “circuity of travel” rubric.
Some might contend that this distinction is an artificial way to impose a limit on
liability when damages truly do exist. Courts have long recognized, however, that
the existence of damage does not necessarily mean there also has been an injury to a
legally-protected interest.385 As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes acutely observed,
“Government hardly could go on if, to some extent, values incident to property could
not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.”386
The importance of drawing a clear line against compensating for loss in property
value due to network-level access changes becomes particularly compelling when
public planning needs are considered. Public choices about which roadway
improvement projects to undertake, and about how they should be designed and
384
One interesting Indiana decision held that an abutter could be liable for having too many
direct connections to the highway. The Holiday Rambler case involved a traffic accident on
State Route 19 outside Utilimaster’s manufacturing plant. Holiday Rambler Corp. v.
Gessinger, 541 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). Utilimaster had four driveways within its
800 feet of frontage on the highway through which its employees would leave when their shift
ended. Id. at 561. The accident occurred when one exiting employee stopped his truck partway into the road to avoid hitting vehicles exiting from the next driveway; a driver on SR 19,
Martha Martin, hit the truck and then spun into the plaintiff’s motorcycle. Id. Utilimaster
argued that it had no duty to control Martin’s conduct and therefore no liability. Id. But the
court held that the company did have a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent a defective
or dangerous condition on its property from causing injury to persons traveling on SR 19;
whether allowing hundreds of employees to exit at the same time through four closely-spaced
driveways breached that duty was a question of fact for the jury. Id. at 562. The plaintiff
contended that the State of Indiana was also liable for failing to close some of Utilimaster’s
access points to the highway and requiring it to use an internal service drive. Id. at 564. The
court held, however, that driveway permitting was a discretionary function for which Indiana
could not be liable under that state’s tort claims act. Id. The dissent in Holiday Rambler felt
that Utilimaster’s conduct was simply that of operating a business, and the “exodus of
employees” at the end of their shift was a normal incident to that business operation. Id. at
565 (Hoffman, J., dissenting). But the majority believed the company had a duty to control
the flow of employee vehicles leaving its property to avoid creating a hazard on the highway.
Id. at 562. This result suggests that the driveway location and spacing requirements of an
access management code may come to define a duty of care, or at least be evidence of a
standard of care, for abutting owners.
385

See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of Transp. v. Tomkins, 749 N.W.2d 716, 729-30 (Mich. 2008)
(Historically, those detrimental effects of a public works project that were experienced by the
public generally were not compensable; such incidental losses are considered to be “damnum
absque injuria—loss without injury.”).
386

Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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built, are heavily influenced by cost. But cost cannot be estimated if a decision
about whether access rights have been taken depends on a later, fact-specific judicial
finding about the “reasonableness” of the access to each parcel whose position
within the roadway network is affected by the road project.
In any event, such criticism of the circuity rule misses the essential point. A
claim of right to an advantageous location within the road network is weak at best,
because the network is not individual property: it is community property, built and
enlarged and maintained and used by the public.387 A change in how the parts of this
road network connect together might enhance the value of some properties; but the
public can make no claim to the increment of private property value added by the
change. So if a change in the connectivity of the network diminishes the value of
other properties, the public should not be subject to a claim for the increment of
value that is lost, either.388
If we accept the fundamental idea that the road network is a public creation, then
when a court allows an owner of property with a commercially advantageous
location within the road network to insist that the public keep the network’s linkages
the same (relative to her property) or pay damages, it allows that owner to stake out a
personal claim of right in the public space. Obviously the improvements on the
property cost money to build, as they would have anywhere else. But an
advantageous location within the road network is not the fruit of any individual
property owner’s labor or investment: it is the product of public investment and the
overall community’s development.389 The existence of those locations, and their
387
Cf. Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 319 (1932) (Courts are averse to equating
property value with a property right, particularly “where the question is not of private rights
alone, but the value was both created and diminished as an incident of the operations of the
government” and “if the enjoyment of a benefit thus derived from the public acts of
government were a source of legal rights to have it perpetuated, the powers of government
would be exhausted by their exercise.”).
388
There is a potential connection between market value and the ad valorem property tax,
which rises or falls in proportion to changes in assessed value. But that tax is not directly on
the value of the property: assessed value is essentially a measuring stick used to gauge what is
being taxed, such as the privilege of membership in a particular community. See, e.g., Fidelity
& Columbia Trust Co. v. City of Louisville, 245 U.S. 54, 59 (1917) (noting “the distinction
between a tax measured by certain property and a tax on that property”); Ohio Grocers Assoc.
v. Levin, 916 N.E.2d 446, ¶¶ 17-21 (Ohio 2009) (distinguishing between “a tax upon a certain
factor” and “a tax upon a privilege measured by that factor”) (emphasis in original). If there is
a connection between market value added (or subtracted) by a property’s change in position
within the road network and its assessed value, the ad valorem property tax would increase or
decrease as a result. But payment of an annual property tax is different than sharing the sale
price (the “value”) of a property. If the public has no right to collect each dollar of a networkrelated increase in value when a property is sold, it should have no duty to pay each dollar of
network-related loss in value, either.
389

The role of the public in creating private property value was highlighted in a different
context in the Penn Central case, where New York’s high court noted that “absent . . . heavy
public governmental investment in . . . connecting transportation, it is indisputable that the
terminal property would be worth but a fraction of its current economic value.” Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1276 (N.Y. 1977). Any analysis of
whether government regulation excessively interfered with Penn Central’s ability to earn a
reasonable return from its investment in the property, in the court’s view, must factor out the
public investment that made Grand Central Terminal “a major transportation nexus [and] had
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commercial exploitability, is every bit as fortuitous as the volume of traffic on the
road.390
The transportation grid and the pattern of land uses overlaid upon it evolved over
time—and continue to evolve—as the product of the land development decisions of
whole neighborhoods of property owners, of road-building decisions made by the
public, periods of regional economic growth and decline, and even the cumulative
choices of a multitude of individual travelers seeking a most-preferred route to their
destinations. The road network developed at the community level, and the benefits
and detriments of any changes to it, although they are felt differently by different
individuals, also occur at the community level. Accordingly, relative accessibility
within the road network should not be considered a subject of individual property
rights.391
VIII. CONCLUSION
The law of access is a judicial effort to balance the interests of owners who
developed their properties with reference to an existing roadway—and have reasons
to want things to stay the same—against the public’s interest in making changes to
improve the roadway or the overall road network.
It emerged during an era in which the common law rejected the idea that an
abutter had any legal right to complain about a use of the street for proper street
purposes.
In reaction, about half the states amended their constitutions to require
compensation whenever private property was “taken or damaged” for public use.
These amendments did not purport to enlarge the concept of “property.” Rather,
they widened the class of compensable events to include situations in which private

contributed substantially to the site’s value.” John J. Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context
for the Grand Central Terminal Decision, 91 HARV. L. REV. 402, 410 (1977).
390

See Bopp v. State, 227 N.E.2d 37, 39 (N.Y. 1967) (traffic volume “may increase the
value of the property, but any such increase is purely fortuitous in the sense that it does not
result from any expenditure of effort or funds on the part of the property owner”); see also
N.Y. State Thruway Auth. v. Ashley Motor Court, Inc., 176 N.E.2d 566, 569 (N.Y. 1961)
(statute restricting billboards directed at drivers on the Thruway held to be constitutional; even
if the legislation abrogated a property right, “[w]hat was taken by the regulation . . . was the
value which the Thruway itself had added to the land and of this the defendant cannot be
heard to complain”).
391
By way of analogy, government regulations that apply at the community level are not
“takings” of private property rights because the resulting benefits and burdens are widespread.
As the U.S. Supreme Court put it:

Even where, the government prohibits a noninjurious use, the, Court has ruled that a
taking does not take place if the prohibition applies over a broad cross section of land
and thereby “[secures] an average reciprocity of advantage.” It is for this reason that
zoning does not constitute a “taking.” While zoning at times reduces individual
property values, the burden is shared relatively evenly and it is reasonable to conclude
that on the whole an individual who is harmed by one aspect of the zoning will be
benefited by another.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 147 (1978) (internal citation
omitted).
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property was damaged for public use even though none of it was physically occupied
(“taken”) by the government.
These changes to state constitutions opened the door to claims that property
abutting a roadway was “damaged” if street improvements interfered with access to
it. Yet courts held that property abutting a public road was damaged, in the
constitutional sense, only when movement between it and the roadway was
obstructed. Once the movement onto the roadway was completed, an abutting
property owner had no greater right to easy or direct or convenient travel than any
other member of the public.392
What courts mean by “access,” however, is often not well defined. Because
certain attributes created by the community as a whole—such as the “arterialness” of
arterial roads, traffic volume, and easy accessibility within the road network—add
value to private real estate, they can become conflated with “access” and mistakenly
seen as aspects of a private property right. Commercial interests have exerted steady
pressure to enlarge the scope of the access right to include these attributes. If that
happens, then the public’s assertion of greater control over the roadway commons to
preserve the traffic-handling capacity of important thoroughfares may be viewed as a
taking of access rights. Consequently, the public would have to pay for the right to
preserve the roadway network it created from traffic interference caused by
opportunistic development that the network attracted.
The goal of this Article is to create a clearer frame of reference for access-related
decisions. Different jurisdictions may well come to different conclusions about the
scope of the access right and, consequently, about where to draw the line between
regulation of access to the publicly-built road network and a taking of private
property.393 No matter where they fall in the balance, however, those decisions
should be a product of thoughtful and well-informed deliberation and cognizant of
the public’s right to conserve its roadways.

392

One notable critic of this concept focused on an unusual instance where an abutter had
access to a public road that did not connect to the network. Stoebuck, supra note 107, at 735.
Such oddities are a weak basis on which to build a network-level access right, however. One
might more precisely say that a public road that does not serve a transportation function—by
connecting to the overall road network or to a transportation node such as a ferry or an
airport—is not a road at all, because it is not a public “way.”
393

Cf. Sauer v. City of New York, 206 U.S. 536, 548 (1907) (“The right of an owner of
land abutting on public highways has been a fruitful source of litigation in the courts of all the
States . . . and each State has in the end fixed and limited, by legislation or judicial decision,
the rights of abutting owners in accordance with its own view of the law and public policy.”).
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